Demand Response and Battery Energy Storage Systems in Electricity Markets: Frameworks & Models by Padmanabhan, Nitin
Demand Response and Battery
Energy Storage Systems in





presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2019
c© Nitin Padmanabhan 2019
Examining Committee Membership
The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. The decision of the
Examining Committee is by majority vote.
External Examiner: Udaya Annakkage
Professor,
Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada
Supervisor(s): Kankar Bhattacharya
Professor,




Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
University of Waterloo
Internal Member: Claudio Canizares
Professor,
Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
University of Waterloo
Internal Member: Ramadan El-Shatshat
Lecturer,
Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
University of Waterloo
Internal-External Member: Jatin Nathwani
Professor,




I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis,
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
iii
Abstract
Ensuring a balance between the generation and demand is one of the most challenging
tasks in power systems because of contingencies, sudden load changes, forecasting errors
and other disturbances, occurring from time to time. The peak demand, which occurs
only for a short duration, has always been a concern for independent system operators
(ISOs), as it leads to high market prices and reliability concerns. Furthermore, in recent
years there have been significant increase in the penetration of renewable energy sources
(RES) to address the challenge of significantly reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) and other
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the system’s dependence on fossil fuels based gen-
eration resources. However, the high penetration of RES, because of their intermittency
and uncertainty, poses operational and reliability issues and thus necessitates an increase
in the procurement and deployment of primary and secondary regulation reserves, as well
as spinning and non-spinning reserves.
In recent years, demand response (DR) and battery energy storage systems (BESS),
because of their characteristic features such as fast response time, high ramp rate, and
the ability to provide flexible upward and downward response as compared to conventional
generators, have been considered as promising and viable options by the ISO to reduce the
peak demand, facilitate RES integration and for the provision of ancillary services, such
as regulation and spinning reserves.
Despite the benefits and the growth opportunities of DR and BESS, there are still many
challenges associated with their market participation. To address the challenges pertaining
to DR and BESS participation in electricity markets, this thesis proposes appropriate mod-
els and frameworks, which can efficiently integrate these resources into the day-ahead and
real-time electricity markets, and at the same time effectively address the aforementioned
challenges of ISOs.
This thesis first presents a new bid/offer structure for DR provisions, simultaneously
through price responsive demand (PRD) based bids and load curtailment based DR offers
from customers. Thereafter, incorporating the DR offer structure, a novel day-ahead, co-
optimizing market auction framework and mathematical model for DR-energy-spinning
reserve market, based on LMPs, which includes transmission loss representation within
the dc power flow constraints is proposed. The impact of DR on both energy and spinning
reserve market prices, market dispatch, line congestions, and other economic indicators,
is studied using the IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS), by considering various scenarios
and cases.
In the next stage, the thesis considers the BESS participation in the day-ahead markets.
First, a novel BESS cost function model, considering Degradation Cost, based on depth of
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discharge (DOD) and discharge rate, and Flexibility Cost, in terms of the battery power-
to-energy (P/E) ratio, is presented. A detailed bid/offer structure based on the proposed
cost functions is formulated. Thereafter, a new framework and mathematical model for
BESS participation in an LMP-based, co-optimized, day-ahead energy and spinning reserve
market, have been developed. Three case studies are presented to investigate the impact
of BESS participation on system operation and market settlement. The proposed model
is validated on the IEEE RTS to demonstrate its functionalities.
Finally, the thesis considers BESS participation in the real-time operations. Firstly, a
novel framework for simultaneously procuring primary and secondary regulation reserves
alongside energy, in a BESS integrated electricity market, by taking into account proba-
bilistic scenarios of contingencies, is proposed. Thereafter, an appropriate mathematical
model is developed considering BESS alongside conventional generators to determine the
optimal real-time primary and secondary regulation reserves and energy market clearing,
in a co-optimized, LMP based market, taking into consideration the a priori cleared day-
ahead market schedules. Lastly, the impact of participation of BESS in day-ahead and
real-time energy and reserve markets on prices, market clearing dispatch, and other eco-
nomic indicators are investigated using the IEEE RTS, for various scenarios and cases.
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Ensuring a balance between the generation and demand is one of the most challenging
tasks in power systems because of contingencies, sudden load changes, forecasting errors
and other disturbances, occurring from time to time. The peak demand, which occurs only
for a short duration, has always been a concern for independent system operators (ISOs),
as it leads to high market prices, operational and reliability concerns.
In recent years, the ISOs have to additionally address the challenge of significantly
reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the system’s
dependence on fossil fuels based generation resources. In accordance with the Paris (climate
change) Agreement of 2015, countries around the globe, including Canada, are in the
transition to a low carbon economy [1]. Accordingly, Canada has set a target to reduce
its 2005 GHG emission levels by at least 30%, by 2030 [2]. GHG emission reductions
of this scale can be achieved through the decarbonization of the electricity system, for
which, a 40% increase in renewable energy sources (RES) is envisioned over the next 10
years in Canada [3]. The high penetration of RES, because of their intermittency and
uncertainty, poses operational and reliability issues and thus necessitates an increase in
the procurement and deployment of primary and secondary regulation reserves, as well as
spinning and non-spinning reserves.
In the context of aforementioned challenges, demand response (DR) and energy storage
systems (ESS) have been receiving significant attention in recent years to provide valuable
services in power systems because of their various advantages [4, 5]. The characteristic
1
features of DR and ESS such as fast response time, high ramp rate, and the ability to
provide flexible upward and downward response as compared to conventional generators,
makes them promising and viable options for the ISO to reduce the peak demand, facilitate
RES integration and for the provision of ancillary services such as regulation and spinning
reserves [5, 6].
As a result, there has been a significant increase in their procurement in electricity
markets. For example, the US had the largest contracted DR capacity of 27,541 MW in
2017, which was a 8% increase from the previous year (2016) [7], which increased the peak
reduction potential to 5.6% from 5% in 2016 [7]. The Independent Electricity System
Operator (IESO) of Ontario, Canada, understanding the importance and benefits of DR,
started an auction mechanism in 2016 to procure DR services from industrial loads. In
2019, the DR procurement by IESO was reported to be 850 MW, which is estimated to
increase by 20% in 2020 [8].
Similarly, when ESS capacity is analyzed, the trend is also very promising. Globally,
the installed capacity of ESS had a growth of 16% from 137 GW in 2010 to 159 GW
in 2018 [9]. One of the studies foresee the economic value of ESS at maximum market
potential to be $228 billion in the US and $600 million in Canada, by 2020 [10]. It is
noted that in recent years, among the various storage technologies, battery energy storage
system (BESS) deployments have increased significantly. It is estimated that the total
BESS capacity installed globally of 11 GWh in 2017 is expected to grow to 100-167 GWh
by 2030 [11]. In the PJM market in US, batteries have provided 41% of the frequency
regulation capacity in 2018 [12]. The main reasons for the wide acceptance and usage of
BESS, as compared to other ESS technologies, are: (i) these can be installed anywhere
in the power system without any geographical restriction (ii) have higher ramp rate than
some of the storage technologies such as pumped hydro (iii) technologies for deploying and
controlling grid-scale BESS are now well matured [13]. Thus, this thesis considers BESS
as the representative technology to study the role, impacts and benefits of ESS.
Despite the benefits and the growth opportunities of DR and BESS, there are still many
challenges associated with their market participation. For example in the case of DR, the
following aspects need attention. Firstly, many electricity markets do not have any provi-
sion for DR participation and hence there is a need to develop appropriate mechanisms for
DR participation. Furthermore, where such provisions exist, the DR provider has to choose
from amongst the currently available participation options in electricity markets such as
price responsive demand (PRD) bids or curtailable-based DR offers. Also to determine
the bid/offer structure to appropriately offer the available DR capacity simultaneously
for services such as energy and spinning reserve. Finally, as the offered and cleared DR
quantities are within the biddable and cleared demand quantities, respectively, it is very
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important to capture the inter-relationships between them. Thus, considering the above
aspects, there is a need to appropriately design the bid/offer structure, develop frameworks
and mathematical models for DR participation in electricity markets.
While for ESS participation in electricity markets, recently some policy interventions
have taken place. The US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 841
issued in 2018 [14] requires ISOs to facilitate the participation of ESSs in energy, ancil-
lary services, and capacity markets, at par with other participants, by introducing changes
in the market design by December 2019. However, there are still many challenges asso-
ciated with the implementation of this Order. For example, the BESS owners, in order
to effectively participate in the electricity markets, should know the actual/marginal cost
of operation of the BESS, which depends on its physical and operational characteristics
such as the state of charge (SOC), depth of discharge (DOD), discharge rate, degradation,
etc. The BESSs have significant advantages over conventional generators because of their
high flexibility in response rates, i.e., the time required to charge or discharge, which is
in milliseconds, and their ability to act both as a generation source and a load. Hence
there is a need to develop appropriately BESS operations cost function model considering
Degradation Cost and Flexibility Cost. Furthermore, based on the proposed cost functions,
bid/offer structures for the BESS to provide multiple products in the electricity markets
need be developed. Finally, as required by FERC Order 841, there is a need for a unified
market settlement framework and comprehensive mathematical models to integrate BESS
in electricity markets.
The electricity market operations are subject to various uncertainties arising due to
increasing penetration of intermittent and non-dispatchable RES, contingencies such as
loss of generators and transmission lines, and sudden load deviations, which can affect
the market operation drastically. Accordingly, the generation and loads are dispatched
through real-time markets to meet the incremental energy needs vis-a-vis the day-ahead
market. Also there is a need to procure and deploy primary and secondary regulation
reserves based on probabilistic operating scenarios and contingencies in the same time
window of real-time markets. In recent years, BESSs have been considered as promising
resources to provide regulation services because of their operational flexibility, as compared
to conventional resources. Thus, there is a critical need to develop bid/offer structures,
and new frameworks and models for simultaneously procuring energy, and primary and
secondary regulation reserves from BESS facilities through real-time markets, along side
conventional generators.
From the above discussions it is clear that the need for tools to understand the economic
and technical impacts of the increasing penetration of DR and BESS in electricity markets
have become the need of the day. This thesis proposes appropriate models and frameworks,
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which can efficiently integrate these resources into the day-ahead and real-time markets,
so as to effectively address the aforementioned challenges.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 DR in Electricity Markets
The DR options available and practiced in electricity markets of today, are: (i) Price-
responsive demand (PRD) bids; and (ii) Curtailment-based DR offers. The PRD bids are
market price dependent, designed to manage price risks, and the ISO has no control on the
demand not cleared. On the other hand, the curtailment based DR provides the customer
an opportunity to provide a service, after the price-responsive loads have been dispatched.
There are different ways in which an ISO may procure and deploy DR services [15,16].
For example, in New York ISO (NYISO) the loads submit DR offers for energy curtail-
ment through their day-ahead DR program (DADRP) [17] and real-time DR programs
(RTDRP), and a reserve capacity service through the demand-side ancillary service pro-
gram [18]. In California ISO (CAISO), there are two types of DR resources: proxy demand
resource (PDR) and reliability DR resource (RDRR) [19]. The PDRs bid for energy cur-
tailment and non-spinning reserves in the day-ahead and real-time markets; while RDRRs
bid for energy curtailment only, in the day-ahead market. In ISO-New England (ISO-NE),
the loads submit DR offers for energy curtailment, as well as offers for providing reserve
services, in the day-ahead markets [20].
In PJM, there are two types of DR programs, economic DR program and emergency
DR program [21]. In the economic DR program, loads can offer demand reductions in the
day-ahead and real-time energy market, and capacity offers for reductions in the synchro-
nized reserve, regulation and day-ahead scheduling reserve markets. In the emergency DR
program, customers who voluntarily reduce their usage in the energy market, during the
event of an emergency, are compensated. In Mid-Continent ISO (MISO), the DR providers
are classified as DR resources (DRR-I and DRR-II) and PRD [22]. Both DRR-I and DRR-
II submit offers for curtailment in the day-ahead and real-time energy and spinning reserve
market, while only DRR-II can bid for regulating reserve services. It is to be noted from
the above discussions that in most of the electricity markets in US the loads can offer for
curtailment through the real-time and/or day-ahead energy markets, in addition to partic-
ipating as usual, to buy energy from the respective energy markets. This implies, the loads
providing DR services submit three bid curves - bids to buy energy, DR offers to curtail
energy, and a DR offer for reserve capacity.
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On the other hand, in Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), load resource
participation (LRP) is one of the DR programs where customers, referred to as load re-
sources (LR), may participate in the real-time market to buy energy [23]. They submit
PRD bids which reflect the LR’s willingness to consume up to a specified market price.
LRs also provide operating reserves in the ancillary service markets in ERCOT. Therefore,
to summarize the ERCOT market, it is the only market in USA to have one energy bid
and one DR capacity bid.
In Ontario, Canada, the IESO conducts an annual DR auction with two settlement
periods (six months each), namely Winter and Summer, where the participants submit
price-quantity offers of the curtailable load [8]; on settlement of the DR auction, the selected
loads are contracted on long-term (six months), for being ready to be curtailed at 1-hour
notice and are dispatched in the real-time energy market or real-time operating reserve
market.
Various researchers have proposed modeling frameworks where DR is considered as an
energy market participant [24,25]. In [24], a day-ahead energy market that integrates DR
bids into the market clearing process, is proposed. The DR providers carry out appropriate
load shifting and curtailment, and use on-site generation and energy storage systems to
respond to ISO’s dispatch instructions. In [25], a price-responsive benefit function of
customers is considered within an energy market settlement to determine the optimal DR
dispatch, although unit commitment (UC) constraints are ignored in the market model.
The flexibility provided by DR makes it an ideal ancillary service provision [26]. The
integration of DR in reserve markets have been discussed in [27–29]. In [27], DR provisions
for reserves, by voluntary reduction during system contingencies is discussed. The DR
reserve offers are modeled considering the additional cost arising from demand recovery
effect after deployment of reserve provisions. In [28], a two-stage stochastic model for
scheduling of reserves using DR in the wholesale electricity market is presented. The
benefits to customers from participating in the DR programs of the ISO are demonstrated.
In [29], a market model is proposed where DR provides up-spinning, down-spinning and
standing reserve. It is shown that participation of DR in reserve markets increases the
social welfare and at the same time provides extra scheduling flexibility.
Although in [24,25], DR was considered only within the energy market settlement, and
in [27–29], these were considered for reserve provisions, ideally DR services can be used in
co-optimized energy and spinning reserve markets simultaneously, on a need basis. The co-
optimized energy and reserve markets result in better economic utilization of the resources.
Some of the markets which use co-optimization for energy and reserve market settlement
are PJM, NYISO, MISO, ERCOT, and IESO. In [30–33], DR is considered in co-optimized
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energy and reserve markets. In [30], a PRD shifting bidding mechanism for demand-side
reserve provisions in a co-optimized energy and reserve market is proposed and the effect
of the incremental costs of exercising the reserves from the demand-side in the market
is investigated. In [31], an energy and spinning reserve market clearing mechanism for a
wind-thermal power system including reserve offers from DR providers, with uncertainty in
wind power and load forecasts is proposed. The results show that a rise in uncertainty level
leads to an increase in total cost and total reserve requirements. However, in [30, 31] the
transmission system model has not been considered and hence the impacts on the power
system are not studied. Furthermore, demand side participation has been considered only
for reserve provisions in the day-ahead market. On the other hand, in [32], [33], DR is
considered to provide services in both energy and spinning reserve markets. In [32], DR
is modeled as price-responsive, shiftable demand in a co-optimized energy and spinning
reserve market, the results show a reduction in total costs and in capacity commitment
from generators. However, with the modeling approach in [32], it is difficult to take into
account the customer preferences to decide what share of the demand, it would bid for
energy and reserve provision. In [33], a stochastic UC model for incorporating DR in
co-optimized electricity market coordinating with renewable energy resources is presented
and a contractual arrangement through aggregators for coupling of renewable resources
with deferrable loads is proposed. However, DR is considered to participate in the market
without bidding and receives a particular price from the aggregator for each unit of energy
not consumed.
From a review of the literature, it is noted that the previous works have mainly focused
on integrating DR into either the energy or the reserve market, and not both. Furthermore,
DR is either modeled to capture the price-responsiveness of a load or its curtailment feature,
but not both simultaneously. Also, the DR offers are not considered in conjunction with
the demand bids, nor DR dispatch in conjunction with the cleared demand. There is also
a need to consider what share of a customer’s total DR it would like to offer in the energy
market and in the spinning reserve market. And finally, none of the reported works on DR
participation have considered transmission losses within the market settlement models.
1.2.2 BESS in Electricity Markets
Presently the BESSs participate in electricity markets through different ways and market
mechanisms across the ISOs [34–38]. The NYISO was the first to initiate a market design
in 2018, whereby the ESSs could offer their services in the wholesale energy, capacity, and
ancillary service markets, in line with the FERC Order 841 [35]. In this market design, the
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physical and operational characteristics of an ESS, such as the upper/lower storage limits,
SOC, response rate, etc., are taken into consideration.
In PJM, which has the highest installed BESS capacity of 300 MW in North America,
BESS participates in the regulation market by submitting two-part offers (capability and
performance); while in the energy market they can only submit positive MW offers (dis-
charging offers) with a $0 offer price [39,40], [41], [42]. However, the PJM market has been
redesigned to comply with FERC Order 841 and BESS will be allowed to submit charging,
discharging and continuous mode operation bids/offers based on cost curves to participate
in the energy market; this change is expected to be operational by the end of 2019 [43].
In CAISO, the BESSs can participate in the day-ahead and real-time regulation markets
by submitting simple price-quantity based bids and offers for these services [34], [36]. In
ISO New England, under the ongoing market design changes, a BESS sized 5 MW or
greater would be able to participate in the regulation market from December 2019 [37].
In Ontario, Canada, the IESO procured 50 MW of ESS capacity in 2014 [38], which
includes thermal energy storage, BESS, flywheels, and power-to-gas (hydrogen storage)
technologies, which are deployed mainly for ancillary services provisions such as regulation,
voltage control and reactive power support. However, the BESSs do not bid to provide
these ancillary services but are procured and paid through long-term contracts.
A review of the current practices adopted in various ISOs reveals the need for a unified
market settlement framework, as required by FERC Order 841, which will allow BESSs to
participate in various markets. To do so, they must submit bids/offers by capturing their
physical and operational characteristics.
Day-Ahead Energy and Reserve Markets
There is a growing body of literature on integrating ESSs into power system operations
[44–47], some recent research has proposed integrating ESS into electricity markets [48–62].
Few works have focused on determining the optimal strategies for coordinated operation
of a wind farm and the ESS facility owned by the same entity and participating in elec-
tricity markets [48–51]. The participation of an ESS as a grid-scale, independently owned
resource, in day-ahead market is discussed in [52–61], which consider optimal bidding and
offering strategies, and dispatch models for ESS considering arbitrage, RES integration,
and ancillary service provisions.
In [52], an approach to simultaneously optimize investments in new generation and
distributed and bulk storage technologies by minimizing the short-term operation cost is
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presented. In [53–57], the optimal bidding and scheduling of ESS in electricity markets
from an owner’s perspective, are presented. In [53], a bidding mechanism based on stochas-
tic programming is developed for a group of ESSs that participate in the day-ahead market
to provide energy and reserve capacity, and in the real-time market to provide energy. The
uncertainty in market prices due to wind power fluctuations and the impact of ESS size
and location are considered, to improve the bidding decisions made by the large ESS units.
In [54], an optimal bidding strategy is proposed for a BESS, maximizing its benefits by
participating in energy and reserve markets. In [55–57], optimal bidding and scheduling
mechanisms for ESS using two stage optimization approaches are proposed. The first stage
maximizes ESS profit, while the second stage maximizes the overall market benefit consid-
ering generation resources and ESS. However, the research in [52–57] neither considers the
loss of life (degradation) aspects of an ESS, nor appropriately model the cost function of
the ESSs in terms of their physical and operational characteristics.
Few works have considered battery degradation in BESS models related to their partic-
ipation in electricity markets [58–62]. In [58], battery degradation is modeled by limiting
the discharge cycle of the battery only, but the degradation aspect is not a part of the
BESS cost function. While [59–62] have considered including battery degradation in mod-
eling the BESS cost function. In [59], a marginal cost function for BESS based on battery
degradation was presented. The degradation cost was formulated using linear or quadratic
terms for the different components of battery wear such as, degradation caused by DOD,
power, and SOC. In [60], a BESS usage cost model was developed by considering degrada-
tion based on cycles and DOD, to determine the optimal schedules in the energy market.
In [61], a piece-wise linear cost function based on battery cyclic aging, using the rain flow
algorithm, was proposed, with bids designed based on the developed cost function. An
optimal bidding strategy was proposed for a BESS in [62] considering the battery cycle
life model and participation in day-ahead energy, spinning reserve, and regulation markets.
However in these works [58,60–62], other important considerations of the BESS such as the
degradation due to discharge rates, the cost of flexibility, etc., have not been considered in
the BESS cost function formulations.
In view of the above discussions it is apparent that BESS cost functions need to be mod-
eled in proper detail, considering the important aspects such as Degradation Cost based
on DOD and discharge rate, and accounting for their flexibility, in a unified market frame-
work, with the objective of maximizing the benefits of all participants. Furthermore, in
the context of FERC Order 841, a generic market operations framework and mathematical
model to integrate BESS into the electricity markets are urgently needed.
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Real-Time Energy and Regulation Markets
Studies have shown that the system frequency regulation capability (β) of different control
areas in the US in last few decades, especially in the Eastern Interconnection, has been de-
clining [63], [64], which has been attributed to high governor dead bands, blocked governors,
etc. [65]. To overcome these problems, FERC Order 842 [66] mandates the new genera-
tion facilities to install, maintain, and operate equipment capable of providing primary
frequency regulation. However, there are no directives in the Order regarding monetary
compensation for primary frequency regulation. The decline in β may also be attributed
to the design of electricity markets that does not incentivize primary regulation reserves.
The need for incentivizing primary regulation is one of the principal recommendations of
an IEEE Task Force Report [67].
Some works reported in the literature [68–75] have considered primary frequency regu-
lation market design. For instance, in [68,69], a market design mechanism for incentivizing
synchronous generators to provide primary frequency regulation is proposed. This work
incorporates metrics for primary regulation such as rate of change of frequency, lowest
frequency reached (frequency nadir), time to reach frequency nadir, etc., by accounting
for characteristics such as inertia, primary regulation capacity, responsive droop curves,
and response triggering time, through various constraints. In [70] a simplified dynamic
model is presented considering generator response, demand behavior and load shedding to
procure frequency regulation reserves through economic dispatch in pool-based electricity
markets. In [71], an algorithm and mathematical model is proposed that simultaneously
minimizes the cost of primary regulation reserves, while ensuring secure operation of the
power system. A decision tree based approach is used to model each pre-specified contin-
gency and arrive at with a set of constraints which are then used in the economic dispatch
problem. In [72], an UC model incorporating system frequency limits, generation ramping
and capacity constraints associated with primary frequency regulation and the relation
between the reserves and the post-contingency system frequency deviation is presented.
The benefits of co-optimized clearing of energy and reserves against sequential clearing, by
highlighting the strong coupling between the primary reserve capacity and pre-contingency
generation, is demonstrated.
A co-optimized market clearing model for energy and primary regulation was presented
in [73] that scheduled and priced the kinetic energy of the generator and primary regulation
reserves by combining the market clearing engine with a primary regulation pricing mech-
anism. In [74], deterministic and probabilistic LMP based market models for energy, and
primary, secondary, and tertiary reserves are presented, and a single price for all reserve
types is determined. It is noted that all the above works have considered the provision
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of primary frequency regulation from synchronous generators only, without exploring the
participation of other viable resources such as energy storage and demand response. In [75],
a market model for procurement of primary regulation from both generators and loads,
considering the regulation requirement based on system inertia is presented.
Secondary regulation is used to reduce the area control error (ACE) through a central-
ized control signal via automatic generation control (AGC), their procurement mechanism
varying across ISOs. For example, PJM procures and schedules secondary regulation re-
serves of 525 MW during non-peak and 800 MW during peak hours through the day-ahead
regulation market [76]. While, the IESO in Ontario, Canada procures 228 MW secondary
regulation reserves each hour through long-term contracts [77]. It is interesting to note
that in PJM only 50-60% [76] and in IESO only 50-70% [77] of the scheduled secondary
regulation reserves are actually deployed in real-time. Thus, it would be more economically
viable to procure a portion of the secondary regulation requirement through the real-time
market, which provides a much closer estimate of the requirement.
It is noted that typically, regulation reserves are procured considering the requirements
for the system as a whole [68] or considering nodal reserve requirements [74]. In either cases,
the regulation reserve requirements are computed considering deterministic conditions of
the system, which, however, may lead to over-estimating the needs, and hence increase the
cost. Therefore, it is necessary to consider realistic operating scenarios and contingencies
while computing the regulation reserve requirements. With the advancements in computing
and software it is possible to adequately consider the contingencies using a probabilistic
approach to model the reserve requirements and deployments with a closer time window
in real-time markets.
In recent years, ESSs have been considered as promising resources to provide regulation
services because of their operational flexibility, characterized by fast response time, high
ramp rate, and capability to provide upward and downward response. Among the various
storage technologies, BESS deployments are significant. Some recent works have considered
BESS participation in regulation markets [78–80]. In [78], an operation and control strategy
for a BESS co-located with a wind farm to provide primary and secondary regulation is
presented. This work proposes an adaptive SOC feedback control mechanism to maintain
the SOC at the optimal value as much as possible and thus reduce the size and extend
the lifetime of the BESS. A profit maximization model for BESS considering the battery
cycle-life is proposed to optimally bid in performance based regulation markets [79]. It is
noted that the works in [78–80] are based on the profit maximization of a BESS owner
only and do not consider the overall system benefits and impacts.
From a review of the literature, it is noted that no reported works have considered the
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simultaneous procurement of primary and secondary regulation reserves provided by BESS
in real-time electricity markets. Thus there is a need to develop frameworks and models
for simultaneously procuring energy, and primary and secondary regulation reserves from
BESS facilities through real-time markets, along side conventional generators.
1.3 Research Objectives
A review of the related works reported in the literature reveals the need for models and
frameworks for integrating DR and BESS into day-ahead and real-time electricity markets.
Accordingly, the objectives of the present research are the following:
• Develop a new bid/offer structure for DR provisions, simultaneously through PRD
based bids and load curtailment based DR offers from customers. Incorporating
the DR offer structure, propose a novel day-ahead, co-optimizing market auction
framework for DR for simultaneous provisions within energy and spinning reserve
markets.
• Develop a comprehensive mathematical model for a DR-energy-spinning reserve mar-
ket, based on LMPs, which includes transmission loss representation within the dc
power flow constraints using a piece-wise linear approximation approach. Investi-
gate the impact of DR on both energy and spinning reserve market prices, market
dispatch, line congestions, and other economic indicators, for various scenarios and
cases.
• Develop a novel BESS cost function model considering the Degradation Cost, which
is based on the DOD and discharge rate, and the Flexibility Cost. Propose a bid/offer
structure based on the cost functions, for BESS to participate in day-ahead energy
and spinning reserve markets, capturing the inter-relationships between the BESS
charging bid and discharging offer quantities.
• Develop a generic market operations framework and comprehensive mathematical
model for the integration of BESS in a LMP based, co-optimized, day-ahead en-
ergy and spinning reserve market by including the proposed BESS charging bid and
discharging offer structure.
• Propose a novel framework for simultaneously procuring primary and secondary reg-
ulation reserves alongside energy, in a BESS integrated electricity market, by taking
into account probabilistic scenarios of contingencies in the real-time operations.
11
• Develop an appropriate mathematical model considering BESS alongside conven-
tional generators to determine the optimal real-time primary and secondary regu-
lation reserves and energy market clearing, in a co-optimized, LMP based market,
taking into consideration the a priori cleared day-ahead market schedules.
• Investigate the impact of participation of BESS in day-ahead and real-time energy
and reserve markets on prices, market clearing dispatch, and other economic indica-
tors, for various scenarios and cases.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents a brief background to
the topics related to this research including electricity markets, ancillary services, DR, ESS
technologies, and BESS degradation mechanism.
Chapter 3 describes the developed bid/offer structure, framework and mathematical
model for simultaneous procurement of DR for energy and spinning reserve provisions in
the electricity market.
Chapter 4 presents novel cost function formulations for BESS considering the Degra-
dation Cost, which is based on the DOD and discharge rate, and the Flexibility Cost.
Thereafter, the proposed framework and model for BESS participation in day-ahead en-
ergy and spinning reserve market is presented.
Chapter 5 presents the framework and mathematical model for simultaneously procur-
ing primary and secondary regulation reserves alongside energy, in a BESS integrated
real-time electricity market.
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions and contributions of this thesis, and






e BESS, e ∈ E.
i, q Indices for the buses, i ∈ I.
j Index for the generators, j ∈ J .
k Indices for time (hour), k ∈ K.
Ei Set of generators connected to bus i.
Parameters
B Element of susceptance matrix, p.u.
Cd, Cu Start-up/shut-down cost of generator, $.
CD Customer’s demand bid price, $/MWh.
CG Generator offer price for energy/spinning reserve, $/MWh.
g Conductance of transmission line, p.u..









Customer’s demand bid quantity, MW.
P
G
Generator offer quantity for energy, MW.
PFlow Maximum capacity of transmission line between buses, MW.
RU , RD Ramp up/down limit of generator, MW/h.
SOC, SOC Maximum/minimum SOC limit of BESS, p.u..
TU , TD Minimum up/down time of generator, hour.
η Battery round trip efficiency, %.
ηCh, ηDch Battery Charging/discharging trip efficiency, %.
Variables
PCh, PDch Charging/discharging power, MW.
PD Demand cleared, MW.
PG Generation offer cleared, MW.
P loss Power loss in the transmission line between buses i and q, MW.
U , V Binary variable = 1, if generator starts/shut downs, and 0 otherwise.
W Binary variable = 1, if generator is committed, and 0 otherwise.
X Binary variable = 1, if demand bid is cleared, and 0 otherwise.
Y Binary variable = 1, if generator offer is cleared, and 0 otherwise.
Z1, Z2 Binary variable = 1, if BESS is charging/discharging, and 0 otherwise.
δ Voltage angle of bus, radian.
2.2 Introduction
This chapter presents a review of the background of the topics related to the research carried
out in this thesis. In Section 2.3, a basic overview of electricity markets including LMP-
based market settlement model is presented. This is followed by an introduction to ancillary
services in Section 2.4. A brief outline of different DR programs is presented in Section
2.5, classification of ESS in Section 2.6, followed by review of important topics related
to BESSs such important terminologies, operational models and the battery degradation
mechanisms in Section 2.7. Finally, Section 2.8 summarizes the chapter.
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2.3 Electricity Markets
Power system restructuring has enabled the emergence of electricity markets around the
world. In the electricity market context, a single entity is no longer in charge. Multiple
agents competitively participate and interact to deliver energy to customers. The main
entities in the electricity markets are: generation company (genco), loads, ISO or market
operator, transmission system operator, regulator, distribution company, and retailers.
The main purpose of electricity markets is trading of energy and other services among
various participants, with an objective to minimize the cost or maximize the social welfare,
subject to generation and transmission constraints [81].
Based on the time scale of operation, there are two types of electricity markets wherein
products such as energy, ancillary services are traded.
a) Day-Ahead Market: In these markets, a daily auction is arranged for the next day
where buyers and sellers submit their bids and offers for energy and ancillary services.
In many jurisdictions, there are separate markets for energy and ancillary services.
Usually, the market is cleared hourly, i.e. the market participants can submit separate
bids for each hour, for the next day [82].
b) Real-Time Market: In these markets, the participants buy and sell electricity close
to real-time, usually 5 minutes ahead [82]. The real-time market balances the differ-
ences between day-ahead commitments and the actual real-time demand. In some
jurisdictions the real-time market is sometimes called balancing market.
In this thesis, ‘offer’ pertains to any service that results in positive injection into the
grid and ‘bid’ pertains to any service that results in negative injection into the grid
The day-ahead and real-time markets can either be a uniform price market i.e., a single
market clearing price is determined for the whole system, or an LMP-based market i.e.,
the price is determined for each node or a zone in the system. In this thesis LMP based
day-ahead and real-time markets have been considered. The basic mathematical model for
an LMP-based market is presented in the next subsection.
2.3.1 LMP Based Market Model
























The first term in (2.1) represents the gross surplus of customers, the second term represents
the total cost of gencos, which includes the start up cost, shut down cost and the energy
cost. The model constraints are discussed next, and are based on [81].
Demand-supply Balance: These constraints ensure a balance between the supply and
demand at each bus i at hour k.∑
j∈Ej






∀k ∈ K, ∀i, q ∈ I (2.2)
In constraints (2.2) the dc-opf equations are used in place of ac power flow equations so as
to reduce the computational burden. It is also to be noted that some LMP-based market
models include losses in the demand-supply balance, and this thesis also considers losses
in the models presented in the subsequent chapters.
Market Clearing Constraints: These constraints ensure that the cleared demand and
generation quantities do not exceed their respective bid/offer quantities,
PDi,k ≤ P
D
i,k Xi,k ∀k ∈ K, ∀i ∈ I (2.3)
PGj,k ≤ P
G
j,k Yj,k ∀k ∈ K, ∀j ∈ J (2.4)
Transmission Line Constraints: These constraints ensure that the line power flows on
the transmission lines are within their limits.
Pi,q,k ≤ PFlowi,q ∀k ∈ K, ∀i, q ∈ I (2.5)
where,
Pi,q,k = Bi,q(δi,k − δq,k) ∀k ∈ K, ∀i, q ∈ I (2.6)
Reserve Constraints: These constraint ensure that the spinning reserve requirement for
the system is provided by the committed generators, as follows:∑
j
(P̄j − PGj,k)Wj,k ≥ RESV
∑
i
PDi,k ∀k ∈ K (2.7)
where, RESV is a parameter decided by the ISO.
Generalized UC Constraints: These constraints include generation limits, ramp-up/down
constraints, minimum-up/down time constraints and coordination constraints.
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The following constraints ensure that the output power of generator j at interval k is
within its maximum and minimum limits.
P jWj,k ≤ PGj,k ≤ P jWj,k ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (2.8)
The ramp-up/down capability of the generator j at interval k is not violated constraints
is ensured by the following constraints,
PGj,k − PGj,k−1 ≤ RUj ∀j ∈ J,∀k ≥ 1 (2.9)
PGj,k−1 − PGj,k ≤ RDj ∀j ∈ J,∀k ≥ 1 (2.10)
The following constraints ensure that the generator j at interval k meets the minimum-
up and down time, requirements [81].
k∑
t=k−TUj+1
Uj,t ≤ Wj,k ∀t ∈ [TUj, K],∀j ∈ J,∀k ≥ 1 (2.11)
k∑
t=k−TDj+1
Vj,t ≤ 1−Wj,k ∀t ∈ [TDj, K], ∀j ∈ J,∀k ≥ 1 (2.12)
The following constraints ensure proper transition of UC states from 0 to 1 and vice-
versa with unit start-up, shut-down decisions,
Uj,k − Vj,k = Wj,k −Wj,k−1 ∀j ∈ J,∀k ≥ 1 (2.13)
Uj,k + Vj,k ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J, k (2.14)
The above presented market model pertains to a day-head market, the model for a
real-time market is almost similar with same objective function and set of constraints
excluding the UC (start-up and shut-down) constraints. In some real-time market models
the objective function may also include the deviation penalties from day-ahead market [83].
The goal of the market operator is to determine the dispatch that maximizes the so-
cial welfare, subject to various constraints. This process determines the marginal cost of
meeting an increment of load at each bus which are referred to as LMPs, which are the
Lagrangian multipliers associated with the supply balance equation in (2.2).
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2.4 Ancillary Services
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) defines the ancillary service as:
“ An interconnected operation service that is necessary to effect a transfer of electricity
between purchasing and selling entities, and which a transmission provider must include in
an open access transmission tariff.” [84]. The ancillary services that are relevant in this
research are briefly discussed:
a) Frequency response service: It refers to the continual balancing of generation and load
to maintain the system’s frequency within an acceptable range. Frequency response
service is the immediate governor response resulting from a change in interconnection
frequency. This service is explicitly meant for a condition which arises due to a
disturbance in the system.
b) Regulation: It refers to the minute-to-minute adjustment of a generator output to
meet the imbalance between total supply and demand in the system. This instan-
taneous response of a generating unit is usually achievable through the use of the
governor-droop characteristic or AGC from the control area determining the required
change (up and down) to the real power output to correct the area control error to
be within bounds.
c) Spinning reserves: The provision of unloaded generating capacity that is synchronized
to the grid and can immediately respond to correct for generation/load imbalances,
caused by generation and/or transmission outages, and that is fully available within
several minutes, typically within 10 minutes as specified by several ISO’s in US and
Canada.
2.5 Demand Response
Demand Side Management (DSM) is the planning and implementation of those utility
activities designed to influence the customer’s use of electricity in ways that will produce
the desired changes in the utility’s load shape, i.e., changes in the pattern and magnitude
of a utility’s load [4]. It comprises the whole range of management schemes linked with
demand-side activities, and it can be classified into DR programs and Energy Efficiency
programs.
Demand Response or DR is defined as “changes in electric use by demand-side resources
from their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity,
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or to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high wholesale
market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized” [4]. DR can be classified as:
Incentive based program (IBP): In this type of program, customer participation is
recognized by providing incentives, since the utility can operate more economically and
reliably. Some of the existing IBPs, such as direct load control (DLC), emergency DR,
demand side bidding and buyback (DR auction markets) are briefly explained next [4].
a) DLC: The utility or system operator remotely turns off or changes the temperature set
points of a customer’s electrical equipment, such as air conditioner and water heater,
on short notice, during critical periods. The customers are generally paid through an
incentive mechanism in the form of electricity bill credits. Program participants are
generally residential and small commercial customers. An example of DLC programs
is the PeaksaverPLUS program, which is implemented in Ontario. In this program,
residential customer’s loads such as air conditioner and water heater are remotely
controlled by the IESO [85].
b) Emergency DR Programs: Customers reduce their loads voluntarily when instructed
by the ISO, and receive incentives based on a pre-specified rate offered by the utility.
There is no penalty applied to the customers if they do not reduce the load when
called for.
c) Demand Side Bidding (DR Auction Markets): These programs allow large customers
to offer a certain amount of load reduction with an associated price in the wholesale
electricity market auction. Once cleared in the auction, these are scheduled and
dispatched in the same way as generators.
Price-Based Programs (PBP): Customers receive price signals for efficient and economic
management of their loads. These DR programs encourage customers to alter their load
pattern such that the system load profile is modified, and at the same time the customer’s
overall electricity cost is reduced. These include three main categories based on Time of
use (TOU) rates, Critical peak pricing (CPP), and Real-time pricing (RTP) [4].
a) TOU Rates: These are pre-set tariff rates, depending on the time of the day and
season of the year, in order to reduce the electricity use at certain time-periods.
b) CPP: It is a modified form of the TOU tariff where during critical peaks, prices are
considerably higher than the average TOU rates. CPP reflects the system stress, and
hence, even though these prices are pre-set, they are applied to customers on short
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notice, when required. An example of CPP program is the Industrial Conservation
Initiative program, which is implemented in Ontario. In this program, industrial
customer’s loads are charged the Global Adjustment which is based on their load
demand during the five coinciding peaks in the system [86].
c) RTP: Unlike TOU and CPP, RTP continuously varies and is not pre-set. This is
related to the wholesale and retail electricity market, and encourages price respon-
siveness of customer in real-time markets.
2.6 Energy Storage Systems
Energy storage refers to the process of storing energy that can then be released to perform
useful operations at a later stage; and an ESS is one which can absorb energy from the
grid (during the period of surplus), store the energy, and inject it back to the grid at a
later time (during period of high demand).
Effective utilization of ESS can contribute significantly to achieve the following goals
in the system: energy security and reliability, electricity price stability, decarbonisation.
The benefits offered by ESS have consequently resulted in their inclusion in electricity
markets. The FERC of US allows the participation of ESS in energy and operating reserve
markets, which has led to over 200 ESS projects in several electricity jurisdictions in the
US [7]. Currently, electricity markets in Canada are also witnessing increased interest from
the industry. In Ontario for instance, the IESO was mandated by the Ministry of Energy
to procure 50 MW of ESS by the end of 2014 [38]; the procurement was planned in two
phases, in Phase - I, 34 MW of ESS was contracted from five companies to provide ancillary
services to the grid. While in Phase - II, 16.75 MW was contracted for 10-years to five
companies, for nine separate ESS projects using thermal energy storage, BESS, flywheels,
power-to-gas (hydrogen storage) technologies.
2.6.1 Classification of ESS Technologies
ESS technologies can be classified according to the form of stored energy, as discussed
below [13]:
a) Electrochemical: These type of storage utilize chemical reactions to convert elec-
trical energy to chemical energy and vice-versa. The process of energy conversion
takes place in an electrochemical cell, where the electrons are transferred between
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electrodes, through electrolytic solution. The examples of electrochemical storage
are batteries, which are further divided into two types - conventional batteries and
flow batteries. The examples of conventional batteries are lead-acid, nickel-based,
lithium-ion etc., while flow batteries include redox flow batteries, hybrid flow batter-
ies etc. Amongst the various battery technologies lithium-ion batteries being widely
deployed for grid scale applications. The battery storage systems have
b) Electrical: These type of storage include double layer capacitors and super capacitors,
where energy is stored in electric fields between charged plates having dielectric
material between them. The capacitors are used for high power applications because
they can discharge very high power in very short duration of time.
c) Electromagnetic: These storage includes superconducting magnetic energy storage
systems which utilize dc currents in superconducting coils to store energy in a mag-
netic field. These storage technology, similar to capacitors are suitable for high power
and low energy applications.
d) Mechanical: These type of storage convert electric energy into mechanical energy
and vice-versa via rotating electric machine, such motor or generator. The energy
is stored in the form of kinetic energy or potential energy. The examples of most
widely used mechanical storage are as follows:
i) Compressed air energy storage (CAES): These type of storage operate in two m
odes - charging and discharging. In charging mode, motors are used to power
turbo compressors to compress large volumes of air into reservoirs usually called
caverns. While in the discharging mode, the compressed air is expanded by
heating and used to drive turbines to generate electricity.
ii) Flywheel Energy Storage: These type of storage use motor and power electronic
devices to accelerate at very high speeds a shaft with a high moment of inertia.
Energy is stored in the rotating shaft as kinetic energy.The fly wheels are are
useful in power applications which requires high response time such as regulation
services.
iii) Pumped hydro storage (PHS): This is one of the most matured and widely
deployed ESS. In PHS, motor pumps are used to pump water from a lower level
reservoir to a higher level reservoir during periods when electricity prices are
low. While during peak hours, stored water is released to rotate turbines and
generate electricity.
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The research presented in this thesis considers BESS for the studies and hence the
following section presents a brief background to BESS.
2.7 Battery Energy Storage Systems
In recent years, there has been an increase in BESS deployment compared with other ESS
as a result of advantages they offer such as high ramp rates, significantly reducing costs,
can be installed without any geographic restrictions etc., in comparison to some other ESS
technologies. In this section a brief review of the BESS components, related important
terminologies, the operational model and the degradation mechanism is presented.
2.7.1 BESS Components
The main components are battery, power converter, transformer, controller, and battery
management system, as shown in Figure 2.7.1 [13]. The basic component BESS is a battery
pack, which is made up of many cells connected in various combination depending upon
the application. For example, for achieving particular voltage level cells are connected in
series, and for achieving particular power rating cells are connected in parallel. The second
important component of the BESS is a power conversion system, which acts as an inverter
when battery is in discharging mode and as a rectifier in charging mode. The converter
is connected to a step-up transformer, which connects the BESS to the main grid. The
controller is the brain of the BESS, which has the logic of the BESS operation and controls
the converter based on pre-defined algorithm. The battery management system monitors
the SOC, charging and discharging levels, temperature etc., to ensure safe and optimal
operation of BESS.
2.7.2 Important BESS Terminologies
The following terminologies are very important for a BESS and have been extensively used
in this thesis. Thus a brief description is given as follows [87,88]:
• Capacity: The capacity of a battery is a measure of the amount of energy that it can
deliver in a single discharge [87]. Battery capacity is normally expressed in amp-hours















Figure 2.1: BESS Layout
• SOC: It represents the available battery capacity (energy) as a percentage of the
maximum battery capacity [87]. It is usually represented in p.u. or percentage (%).
• DOD: It represents the battery capacity that has been discharged expressed as a
percentage of the maximum battery capacity [87]. It is usually represented in p.u. or
percentage (%). For example, 50% DOD means that half of the energy in the battery
is discharged. A 70% DOD means that seventy percent of the battery is discharged
and now battery holds on 30% of the energy.
Thus, DOD = 1- SOC
• Discharge rate: The rate at which the battery is discharged with respect to its
maximum capacity.
In this thesis, the discharge rate of a battery, denoted by DCR, is expressed as the




= ∆SOCk ∀k ∈ K (2.15)
The discharge rate is represented in terms of ’C’, where 1C denotes the full discharge
of the battery in 1-hour, 2C the full discharge in 30 minutes, 3C the full discharge in
20 minutes and so on. In the same context, 0.5C denotes 50% of the full discharge
in 1-hour.
• Cycle Life: The number of discharge-charge cycles the battery can experience before
it fails to meet specific performance criteria [88]. Cycle life is estimated for specific
charge and discharge conditions. It is to be noted that the actual operating life of
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the battery is affected by the discharge rate and DOD and by other conditions such
as temperature and humidity. The higher the DOD, the lower the cycle life.
• P/E ratio: It is the ratio of the rated power capacity of the battery, P (kW or MW)
to rated energy capacity of the battery, E (kWh or MWh) [88].
• Droop characteristics: Governor droop refers to the speed (frequency) versus output
characteristic of the generator. Traditionally, droop control is deployed to enable
parallel operation among spinning generators, for sharing the load change in the
system, which results in a deviation in the system frequency. Each generator with
a different operating condition has a different droop characteristic and it shares the
change in the system load as per its preset droop rate. Of late, the droop control
technique has been applied to applications such as DC grid, HVDC and ESS [89].
The droop characteristics of a BESS is different from those of generators because of its
distinct charging and discharging modes of operation. The BESS droop characteristic
is dependent on the SOC of the battery; a typical BESS droop characteristic is shown
in Fig. 2.2 and discussed in [89]. In recent years, BESSs have been considered
as promising resources to provide regulation services because of their operational
flexibility, characterized by fast response time, high ramp rate, and capability to
provide upward and downward response. This thesis considers BESS for primary
regulation reserve provisions based on its droop characteristics, as in Fig. 2.2.
2.7.3 BESS Operational Model
The general model of a BESS is described here [54]. The BESS constraints include the
energy balance and constraints to prevent simultaneous charging/discharging, and limits
on SOC and charging/discharging power, as follows:








∆k ∀e, ∀k ≥ 1 (2.16)
Constraints (2.16) ensure the energy balance of the ESS.
Z1e,k + Z2e,k ≤ 1 ∀e, k (2.17)
Constraints (2.17) ensure that that the charging and discharging operation in an ESS does















Figure 2.2: BESS Droop Characteristics [87]
SOCe ≤ SOCe,k ≤ SOCe ∀e, k (2.18)
Constraints (2.18) ensure the SOC of the ESS is within its limits.
PChe,k ≤ P
Ch
e Z1e,k ∀e, k (2.19)
PDche,k ≤ P
Dch
e Z2e,k ∀e, k (2.20)
Constraints (2.19) and (2.20) ensure that the ESS charging and discharging power are
within their limits.
2.7.4 BESS Degradation Mechanism
In most of the electrochemical batteries, the battery degradation results in two types of
aging: (i) calender aging, and (ii) cyclic aging. The capacity fading and increase in battery
resistance over a period of time, without the influence of external factors, is referred to as
degradation due to calender aging; the degradation that occurs due to the actual operation
of the battery i.e., its cycling during charging and discharging modes, is referred to as
degradation due to cyclic aging [90]. Degradation due to calender aging is minimal when
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short-term operation is considered, and hence can be neglected. As the scope of this thesis
pertains to short-term operation of BESS, the battery’s degradation due to cyclic aging
has been considered in the cost function modelling presented in Chapter 4.
The cyclic aging is influenced by non-operational factors such as ambient tempera-
ture, ambient humidity, battery state of health etc., and operational factors such as DOD,
appropriate SOC limits, charge/discharge rate, etc.
Among the aforementioned, the operational factors significantly affect the degradation
mechanism when considered for short-term operations, of which, the DOD is the most
important factor as it affects the cycle life the most. For example, a lithium ion battery used
for grid scale applications would be able to operate for only 800 cycles when cycled at 80%
DOD whereas can operate for 6000 cycles when at 10% DOD. Such non-linear relationships
between cycle-life and the DOD is observed in most of the static electrochemical batteries.
Similarly, the high charge/discharge rate of BESS accelerates the degradation process. So is
the effect of extreme value of SOC. Hence it is very important to consider these operational
factors while modelling the battery degradation.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, an overview of electricity markets was presented, elaborating upon the
structure and types of markets and the mathematical formulation of the LMP-based mar-
ket. Thereafter discussion on various ancillary services and a brief review of the DR
programs were presented. The BESS operational characteristics and degradation process
was discussed since it is an essential feature considered in this research.
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Chapter 3
Simultaneous Procurement of DR in





i, q Indices for the buses, i ∈ I.
j Index for the generators, j ∈ J .
k, t Indices for time (hour), k ∈ K.
h Index for blocks of customer bids, h ∈ NCB.
n Index for blocks of generator offers, n ∈ NGB.
l Index for segments in piece-wise linear approximation, l ∈ L.
Ei Set of generators connected to bus i.
1Parts of this chapter have been published in: N. Padmanabhan, M. Ahmed, and K. Bhattacharya,
“Simultaneous procurement of demand response provisions in energy and spinning reserve markets”,IEEE
Trans. Power Systems, vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 4667-4682, Sep. 2018.
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Parameters
B Element of susceptance matrix, p.u.
Cd, Cu Start-up/shut-down cost of generator, $.
CD Customer’s demand bid price, $/MWh.
CDRE, CDRSR DR offer price in energy/spinning reserve auctions, $/MWh.
CG, CGSR Generator offer price for energy/spinning reserve, $/MWh, $/MW.
DRT Maximum duration of DR service offered by a customer at a bus in a
day, hour.
g Conductance of transmission line, p.u..
P , P Maximum/minimum limit on power output of generator, MW.
P
D










Generator offer quantity for energy/spinning reserve, MW.
PFlow Maximum capacity of transmission line between buses, MW.
RU , RD Ramp up/down limit of generator, MW/h.
TU , TD Minimum up/down time of generator, hour.
α Slope of segment of the linearized voltage angle difference between
buses.
β Share of the total DR offer quantity, as a fraction of the maximum
demand bid of the customer at the bus.
β1, β2 Share of the DR offer quantity for energy/spinning reserve provision,
as a fraction of the maximum demand bid of the customer at the bus.
γ Share of the total cleared DR quantity, as a fraction of the total cleared
demand of the customer at the bus.
γ1, γ2 Share of the cleared DR quantity for energy/spinning reserve provision,
as a fraction of the total cleared demand of the customer at the bus.
γ3 Share of the cleared DR quantity for energy provision, as a fraction
of the difference of demand cleared and DR contracted for spinning
reserve services.
28
γ4 Share of the cleared DR quantity for spinning reserve provision, as a
fraction of the difference of demand cleared and DR dispatched for
energy services.
ω Share of the generator’s total offer quantities, as a fraction of the max-
imum capacity of the generator.
ω1, ω2 Share of the generator’s offer quantities for energy/spinning reserve, as
a fraction of the maximum capacity of the generator.
∆δ Upper bound on piece-wise angle blocks, radian.
Variables
PD Demand cleared, MW.
PDRE, PDRSR DR cleared in energy/spinning reserve auctions, MW.
PG, PGSR Generation/spinning reserve offer cleared, MW.
P loss Power loss in the transmission line between buses i and q, MW.
U , V Binary variable = 1, if generator starts/shut downs, and 0 otherwise.
W Binary variable = 1, if generator is committed, and 0 otherwise.
W s Binary variable = 1, if energy offer of generator is cleared and 0 oth-
erwise.
X Binary variable = 1, if demand bid is cleared, and 0 otherwise.
Y , Z Binary variable = 1, if DR is cleared in energy/spinning reserve auction,
and 0 otherwise.
δ Voltage angle of bus, radian.
λE Market clearing price for energy at a bus, $/MWh.
λSR Market clearing price for spinning reserve, $/MW.
3.2 Introduction
DR is an important tool for the ISO for reliable operation of electricity markets, and
there has been considerable interest from load-side market participants as well, to offer
their services for DR provisions. In this environment, the ISO needs to develop effective
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mathematical models for procurement of DR so as to maximize its benefits, such as reducing
the peak demand, regulating electricity price shocks, and exploiting its flexibility attributes.
This chapter first presents a novel and comprehensive formulation of the DR offers, tak-
ing into account customer preferences for simultaneous participation in energy and spin-
ning reserve markets. Various parameters of the DR offers and their inter-relationships
with the demand offers, and the clearance of the demand and DR bids are brought out.
Thereafter, a new mathematical model for an LMP-based, loss included, day-ahead, co-
optimized, energy and spinning reserve market including DR provisions, is proposed. A
new proposition for DR participants to submit their offers in both energy and spinning
reserve markets is presented. Case studies of DR providers participating only in the en-
ergy market, both energy and spinning reserve markets, and only in the spinning reserve
market, are considered, to examine the impact on system operation, market prices and DR
provider’s benefits. The proposed model is tested on the IEEE Reliability Test System
(RTS) to demonstrate its functionalities and the results clearly justify the merits of DR
being included in a co-optimized energy and spinning reserve market.
3.3 Modeling of DR Offers
3.3.1 Customer’s DR Offers:
It is proposed that large industrial or commercial customers can provide DR services in
the day-ahead energy market and the spinning reserve market. The customer will have
provision to participate in the markets in three ways (i) buy energy as a PRD, (ii) provide
DR services in the energy market, and (iii) provide DR services in the spinning reserve
market. Accordingly, the customer will submit in the day-ahead energy market, PRD bids
to buy energy and DR offers to curtail its demand, and submit DR offers in the spinning
reserve market to provide reserve capacity. The difference between the two DR products in
the energy and spinning reserve markets is that, if DR offers are cleared in the day-ahead
energy market, it would be available for dispatch in the real-time operations, and if it is
cleared in the spinning reserve market it would provide a reserve capacity. The demand
bids and DR offers are submitted in price-quantity pairs, as step functions. A general
representation of the customer’s demand bid, DR offer quantities and cleared quantities,
along with the time-line of the operational events are shown in Fig. 3.1. During the offer
submission period, the customer submits its demand bids and DR offers in blocks, where
DR offers are parts of the demand bids, as shown in Fig. 3.1. After market clearing, the
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dispatch schedules are obtained, and it is noted that the cleared DR quantities need be
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are posted
Figure 3.1: Customer’s bid/offer and cleared quantities in day-ahead energy and spinning
reserve markets
The total DR offer in the day-ahead energy market and the spinning reserve market by
a customer at bus i and hour k is limited by a parameter β denoting the share, the total
DR provisions account for, as a fraction of the maximum demand bid of the customer at





h,i,k ≤ β P
D
h,i,k ∀h ∈ NCB,∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (3.1)
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Also, the DR quantities offered in the day-ahead energy market and the spinning reserve
market by the customer at bus i and hour k are limited by the parameters β1 and β2




h,i,k ≤ β1 P
D
h,i,k ∀h ∈ NCB,∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (3.2)
P
DRSR
h,i,k ≤ β2 P
D
h,i,k ∀h ∈ NCB,∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (3.3)
β1 + β2 ≤ β (3.4)
It is to be noted that the parameters β, β1 and β2 will be decided by the customer.
However, β need be capped by the market regulator so as to reduce the market power of
any given customer.
3.3.2 Genco Offers:
The ISO also receives offers from generating companies (gencos) for both the energy and
spinning reserve markets, and the total offer by a generator j at hour k is limited by a









n,j,k ≤ ω P j ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (3.5)
It is to be noted that, the parameter ω is supposed to be in the range of [0,1]. In this
work we assume ω=1, which means the full capacity of the generator is utilized to provide
energy and spinning reserve service only. If ω is less than 1, it implies the generator is
providing some other ancillary service for which capacity is reserved, such as regulation
reserve.
The generator offer quantities in day-ahead energy market and spinning reserve markets
respectively by generator j at hour k, are limited by the parameters ω1 and ω2 denoting
the maximum share of these components as a fraction of the maximum capacity of the










n,j,k ≤ ω2 P j ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (3.7)
It is to be noted that the parameters ω, ω1 and ω2 will be decided by the genco, while
satisfying the relation:
ω1 + ω2 ≤ ω (3.8)
The structure of the day-ahead market settlement model with DR is shown in Fig.
3.2. The ISO receives detailed information on the bids and offers, for energy, DR and
spinning reserve services, from both customers and gencos, as per the bid-offer structure
of these entities, discussed earlier. Other supplementary information on system operation
from various market participants are also received by the ISO. Based on these inputs,
the proposed markets are simultaneously cleared through the joint optimization model, as
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Figure 3.2: Proposed framework for DR participation in day-ahead energy market and
spinning reserve markets
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3.4 Proposed Market Model Including DR
3.4.1 Detailed Formulation
Objective Function




















































The first term in (3.9) represents the gross surplus of customers, the second term
represents the total cost of gencos, which includes the start up cost, shut down cost and
the energy cost. It should be noted that the no-load cost of the generators are represented
by the first block of the 3-block offer price submitted by them. Furthermore, the quantity
corresponding to the first offer block is chosen as the minimum loading of the generator
(P j). The third term represents the total cost for the DR provider for DR provisions in the
energy market and the spinning reserve market, and the fourth term represents the cost of
spinning reserve provisions from generators. The objective function in (3.9) is subjected
to the following constraints,
Demand Supply Balance













where, the cleared generation for a generator j at hour k is the sum of generation




PGn,j,k ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (3.11)
The cleared DR for energy provisions for a customer at bus i and hour k is the sum of




PDREh,i,k ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (3.12)
The cleared demand for a customer at bus i and hour k is the sum of demand cleared




PDh,i,k ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (3.13)
In real power systems, transmission losses are typically in the range of 4-6% [91], and
ignoring this in market clearance and dispatch models gives rise to significant levels of
approximation and differences from actual. Even in the well designed IEEE RTS considered
for studies, it is noted that system transmission losses account for about 1.5% of the
dispatched energy or 1000 MWh of energy loss over a day. Therefore, it was felt necessary
to explore the comprehensive behavior of the power system through modeling, for the
proposed market auction model. The transmission line losses are included in the model by
means of a piece-wise linear approximation [81], as follows,
P lossi,q = gi,q
L∑
l=1
αi,q(l)(δi(l)− δq(l)) ∀i, q ∈ I (3.14)
where,
αi,q(l) = (2l − 1)∆δ ∀i, q ∈ I,∀l ∈ L (3.15)
Market Clearing Constraints
These constraints ensure that cleared demand bids, generator offers and DR offers do not











n,j,k ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K, ∀n ∈ NGB (3.17)
The cleared generation quantity and spinning reserve capacity of a generator j at hour
k, should not exceed the maximum offer quantity of that generator, as per (3.16)-(3.17).
PDh,i,k ≤ P
D
h,i,k Xh,i,k ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K, ∀h ∈ NCB (3.18)
PDREh,i,k ≤ P
DRE
h,i,k Yh,i,k ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K, ∀h ∈ NCB (3.19)
PDRSRh,i,k ≤ P
DRSR
h,i,k Zh,i,k ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K, ∀h ∈ NCB (3.20)
The cleared demand and cleared DR service in energy and spinning reserve market for
a customer at bus i and hour k should not exceed the maximum energy buy bid quantity
and DR offer quantity of that customer as per (3.18)-(3.20).
DR Constraints
It is very important to ensure that the DR cleared in the energy market and in the spinning




i,k ≤ γPDi,k ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (3.21)
Note that the baseline demand from which the load is curtailed, is the market clearing
demand, PDi,k, given by (3.13), and depends on the PRD bids and prevailing system and
market conditions. This is in line with the practice adopted in some electricity markets,
where a customer baseline load, for an hour, is determined from the actual demand of the
customer, typically considering a period of previous 5 to 10 days [18], [92], [93].
The constraint (3.21) limits the DR dispatched for energy services and the DR com-
mitted for spinning reserve by the customer at bus i and hour k by a parameter γ denoting
the share, the total cleared DR provision account for, as a fraction of the cleared demand
for the customer.
The DR quantities cleared in the energy market and the spinning reserves market for
the customer at bus i and hour k is limited by a parameters γ1 and γ2 denoting the share,
of these DR services account for, as a fraction of the cleared demand for the customer.
These are ensured by the following constraints:
PDREi,k ≤ γ1PDi,k ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (3.22)
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PDRSRi,k ≤ γ2PDi,k ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (3.23)
γ1 + γ2 ≤ γ (3.24)
It is to be noted that, γ, γ1, γ2 are imposed by the ISO depending on the various
conditions in the market. For example, on a peak summer day or a peak winter day,
the ISO forsees a sudden increase in the peak demand. In this situation, the ISO would
appropriately increase the value of γ1, so as to procure more DR in the energy market to
reduce the peak demand. Similarly, when sufficient spinning reserve cannot be procured
from generators because of maintenance, repair etc., more spinning reserve would need be
procured through DR, and this will result in increased value of γ2.
Additionally, the DR provision for the customer at bus i and hour k in energy market
is limited by a parameter γ3 which denotes the share of the cleared demand net of the DR
contracted for spinning reserve services. Also, the DR provision for the customer at bus i
and hour k in spinning reserve market is limited by a parameter γ4 which denotes the share
of the cleared demand net of the DR dispatched for energy services. These are ensured by
the following constraints,
PDREi,k ≤ γ3(PDi,k − PDRSRi,k ) ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (3.25)
PDRSRi,k ≤ γ4(PDi,k − PDREh,i,k ) ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (3.26)
γ3 + γ4 ≤ γ (3.27)
It should be noted that the parameters γ3 and γ4 overlap with γ1 and γ2 to some extent;





which being provided by the same DR provider at the same time. The parameters γ3 and γ4
are new propositions by the authors with an understanding that the allocation of DR from
a customer for energy and spinning reserve provisions should be comparable in quantities,
as far as possible. The values of γ3 and γ4 would be selected by the ISO from a priori
knowledge of system conditions and reserve availability from conventional generators, and
can vary with time.
The normal operation of the customer should not be affected when it provides DR
services. The DR provider will specify in its offers, the maximum duration for which it is
willing to provide services in the energy and the spinning reserve markets. This is included





Zh,i,k ≤ DRT i ∀i ∈ I, h = 1 (3.28)
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Spinning Reserve Constraints
These constraints ensure that the spinning reserve requirement for the system is met for
each hour k. It is assumed that the total spinning reserve requirement at an hour k is at









(PDi,k − PDREi,k ) ∀k ∈ K (3.29)
where, the spinning reserve cleared from a generator j at hour k is the sum of the spinning




PGSRn,j,k ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (3.30)
The cleared DR service for spinning reserve provisions from a customer at bus i and




PDRSRh,i,k ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (3.31)
The spinning reserve provided by a generator is constrained by its capacity net of the
cleared dispatch, given as follows:
PGSRj,k ≤ P j − PGj,k ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (3.32)
Transmission Line Constraints
These constraints ensure that the line power flows are within their limits.
Bi,q(δi,k − δq,k) ≤ PFlowi,q ∀i, q ∈ I (3.33)
Generation Limits
These constraints ensure that the output power of generator j at interval k is within its
maximum and minimum limits.
P j Wj,k ≤ PGj,k ≤ P j Wj,k ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (3.34)
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Ramping Constraints
The ramp-up/down capability of the generator j at interval k is not violated constraints
is ensured by the following constraints,
PGj,k ≤ PGj,k−1 +RUj ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (3.35)
PGj,k−1 − PGj,k ≤ RDj ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (3.36)
Minimum-Up and Down Constraints
These constraints ensure that the generator j at interval k meets the minimum-up and
down time requirements [24].
k∑
t=k−TUj+1
Uj,t ≤ Wj,k ∀t ∈ [TUj, K],∀j ∈ J (3.37)
k∑
t=k−TDj+1
Vj,t ≤ 1−Wj,k ∀t ∈ [TDj, K],∀j ∈ J (3.38)
Coordination Constraints
These constraints ensure proper transition of UC states from 0 to 1 and vice versa with
unit start-up, shut-down decisions.
W s1,j,k = Wj,k ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (3.39)
Wj,k −Wj,k−1 ≤ Uj,k − Vj,k ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (3.40)
Uj,k + Vj,k ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (3.41)
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3.4.2 Market Design Aspects
In the proposed market model, the selection of the parameters associated with DR services
are vital for the proper functioning of the model and also impact the market price. The
parameters β, β1, β2 relate to the customer side of the DR offers while γ, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4
govern the clearing of DR offers by the ISO. These parameters are inter-related as discussed
in the mathematical formulation of the market model. Fig. 3.3 shows how these parameters
are input to the model. The customer side parameter β decides the total DR offer quantity
of the customer, while β1 and β2 specify the share of DR quantity offered to the different
markets, respectively. On the other hand, γ specifies the total amount of DR to be cleared
in the market and γ1 and γ2 represent the DR share the ISO would like to procure from each
market, and would ideally be based on a load forecast and prevailing system conditions.
The parameters γ3, and γ4, which are mutually coupled, relate the cleared DR quantities
for different services. The ISO will typically announce the parameters γ, γ1, γ2, γ3 and γ4
in advance, and based on this information, the DR providers would decide the appropriate
values of β1 and β2. However, there is a need for more detailed studies and analyses to bring
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Figure 3.3: Interrelationship of DR parameters in the market operation
3.5 Results & Discussions
To validate the proposed day-ahead market model for energy and spinning reserve with
DR provisions, a slightly modified version of the IEEE RTS (Fig. 3.4) [94] is considered,
which includes 32 generators, loads at 17 buses, and 37 transmission lines. The hydro
generators are neglected and the loads are scaled up by 25%. The generator supply offers
and customer DR offers are in three price-quantity blocks with increasing steps of prices for
each block. It is assumed that the generators offer their energy at the incremental cost of
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generation, and spinning reserve at 40% of their incremental cost. It is also assumed that
the full capacity of a generator is utilized to provide energy and spinning reserve service
only (i.e., ω = 1) and the generator bids 80% of its capacity for energy (i.e., ω1 = 0.8) and
20% for spinning reserves (i.e., ω2 = 0.2). The generator offers for energy and spinning
reserves are given in Appendix (Table B.1).
The demand buy bids are of the same structure as generator supply offers but in
decreasing steps of prices for each block. It is assumed that 70% of the total demand
is price inelastic and their bid prices are considered to be very high. Each DR provider
submits separate offers for energy and spinning reserve services. It is assumed that the
offer price for DR provision in spinning reserve market is 40% of the offer price for energy
services. The maximum DR offer from a customer is assumed to be 10% of its demand bid
quantity. The demand bids to buy energy, and DR offers for energy and spinning reserves
are given in Appendix (Table B.2). For the sake of simplicity, we have considered only one
customer at each bus.
The proposed model is formulated as a mixed integer programming (MIP) problem
and solved using the CPLEX solver in General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) [95].
To investigate the impact of DR on market clearing and on the system operation, four
scenarios are considered as follows:
• Scenario 1: Normal operation.
• Scenario 2: 155 MW generator at bus-16 is on outage during hours 17-20.
• Scenario 3: Line 14-16 is on outage during hours 16-21.
• Scenario 4: 20% increase in demand at hour 18, 19.
Each scenario examines four market design cases as follows:
• Case 1: Base case with PRD only.
• Case 2: DR services in energy market only (β1=0.1, β2=0, γ1=0.1, γ2=0, γ3=0.05,
γ4=0.05).
• Case 3: DR services equally offered in both energy and spinning reserve market
(β1=0.05, β2=0.05, γ1=0.05, γ2=0.05, γ3=0.05, γ4=0.05).
• Case 4: DR services in spinning reserve market only (β1=0, β2=0.1, γ1=0, γ2=0.1,
γ3=0.05, γ4=0.05).
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Figure 3.6: Cleared quantities for a customer at bus-1, hour-18
3.5.1 Scenario-1: Normal Operation
The bid/offer curves of the customer at bus-1, hour-18 (PRD bid curve to buy energy,
the curtailment based DR offer curves for energy and capacity respectively) are shown as
price-quantity blocks in Fig. 3.5. The bid/offer data are extracted from the Appendix
(Table B.2). A brief insight is provided next to demonstrate how the customer decides its
DR offer quantities for energy and spinning reserve provisions, as per equations (3.1)-(3.4)
of the proposed model:
• Let the customer choose β = 0.1, and β1 = β2 = 0.05.
• β = 0.1 implies that a maximum share of 10% of the customers demand bid is
available for total DR provisions in the energy and spinning reserve markets, as per
(3.1).
• β1 = β2 = 0.05 implies that a maximum share of 5% of the customers demand bid
















1,1,18 ≤ 7.56 MW.
– Also, P
DRE
1,1,18 ≤ 3.78 MW and P
DRSR
1,1,18 ≤ 3.78 MW.






1,1,18 = 3.78 MW.




h,i,k are based on the market clearing prices for
energy and spinning reserves, discussed as follows:
• Demand Clearing : The LMP obtained from the proposed model is λE1,18 = 82.97
$/MWh. Those demand bids with prices higher than 82.97 $/MWh are cleared. It
is seen from Fig. 3.5(a) that only the first block is cleared and the total demand
cleared is PD1,18 = 75.6 MW = P
D
1,1,18.
• Clearing of DR in Energy Market : The blocks which have an offer price less than
λE1,18 are cleared. It is seen from Fig. 3.5(b) that only one block of DR is cleared, for
an amount PDRE1,18 = 3.78 MW = P
DRE
1,1,18.
• Clearing of DR in Spinning Reserve Market : Offers with prices below λSR1,18 = 27.2
$/MW are cleared. It can be noted from Fig. 3.5(c) that although the offer price of
the first block is less than λSR1,18, this block is not cleared. This is because of (3.28),
which limits the maximum duration for which the customer can provide DR service
(i.e., DRT 1 = 4 hours). The customer is cleared to provide DR in energy market for
4 hours, during hours 18-21, and no DR is cleared for the spinning reserve market,
i.e., PDRSR1,18 = 0 MW. Accordingly,
Y1,1,k =
{
1, ∀k = 18, 19, 20, 21
0, Otherwise
(3.42)
Z1,1,k = 0 ∀k (3.43)
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The market clearing for the customer for hour-18 is shown in Fig. 3.6. The relationship




1,18 ) to meet the cus-
tomer’s physical constraints and preferences are related by (3.21)-(3.28) of the proposed
model and are discussed next.
• It is assumed that the ISO chooses γ = 0.1, γ1 = γ2 = 0.05, γ3 = γ4 = 0.05.
• γ = 0.1 implies that the total DR quantity that can be cleared in the energy and
spinning reserve market is limited to 10% of total cleared demand, as per (3.21).
– Thus, when PD1,18 = 75.6 MW, the maximum total DR that can be cleared for
energy and spinning reserve provisions is 7.56 MW. As per Fig. 3.6(b) and
3.6(c), it is noted that the total DR cleared is 3.78 MW, which satisfies (3.21).
• γ1 = γ2 = 0.05 implies that the DR quantity cleared in the energy market and
spinning reserve market, separately, has to be less than 5% of the cleared demand of
the customer.
– Hence PDRE1,18 ≤ 3.78 MW and PDRSR1,18 ≤ 3.78 MW, as per (3.22) and (3.23),
respectively.
– As noted earlier, based on market price, the system need, and physical con-




• γ3 = 0.05 implies that the DR quantity cleared in the energy market has to be less
than 5% of the cleared demand net of DR cleared for spinning reserve, as per (3.25).
Similarly, γ4 = 0.05 implies that the DR quantity cleared in the spinning reserve
market has to be less than 5% of the cleared demand net of the DR cleared for
energy provision, as per (3.26).
– Hence PDRE1,18 ≤ 3.78 MW, and PDRSR1,18 ≤ 3.59 MW.
– Note from Fig. 3.6(b) and 3.6(c) that PDRE1,18 = 3.78 MW and P
DRSR
1,18 = 0 MW,
which satisfies (3.25) and (3.26).
Finally, the actual consumption of the customer at bus-1, hour-18, is given by:
• Demand cleared in the market - DR cleared for energy provision
= PD1,18 - P
DRE
1,18
= 75.6 MW - 3.78 MW = 71.82 MW
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• Spinning reserve provision, PDRSR1,18 = 0 MW.
The relationship between the bid/offer quantities and the cleared quantities of the












































































































































             1             2            3            4             5               0              1             2            3              4             5             
Demand bid quantity, 𝑷𝑫 (MW)                             
(a) 
DR offer quantity for energy, 𝑷𝑫𝑹𝑬 (MW)                
(b) 
DR offer quantity for spinning reserve, 𝑷𝑫𝑹𝑺𝑹 (MW)                








































































             1             2            3            4             5               0              1             2            3              4             5             
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(a) 
Cleared DR  for energy, 𝑷𝑫𝑹𝑬 (MW)                
(b) 
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(c)                                                                   
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λE  = 62.57 $/MWh λE  = 62.57 $/MWh λSR  = 27.2 $/MW 
Figure 3.9: Cleared quantities for a customer at bus-16, hour-18
Next, an example is considered to demonstrate a case where the market model selects
DR for both energy and spinning reserves, at a given hour. The bid/offer data of a customer
at bus-16 for hour-18 is used, extracted from the Appendix (Table B.2). It is assumed that
all the market parameters (βs and γs) have same values as in the previous example, and the
selections of bid/offer quantities and market clearings are carried out in the same step-by-
step manner. Accordingly, the bid/offer curves and the cleared quantities of the customer
are shown in Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3.9, respectively.
• The LMP was obtained as λE16,18 = 62.57 $/MWh; since all three demand bids have
prices higher than 62.57 $/MWh, (Fig. 3.8(a)), they are cleared and the total cleared
demand PD16,18 = 100 MW.
• Only the first DR block for DR offers in energy market (Fig. 3.8(b)) is cleared since
it had an offer price less than λE16,18. Thus, P
DRE
16,18 = 3.5 MW.
• Only the first DR block for DR offers in spinning reserve market (Fig. 3.8(c)) is




























Figure 3.10: Bid/offer and cleared quantities of a customer at bus-16, hour-18
• Since the customer can provide DR services for a maximum of 4 hours (i.e.,DRT 16
= 4 hours), this customer is cleared for 2 hours each in energy and spinning reserve
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markets during hours 18-19. Accordingly,
Y1,16,k =
{





1, ∀k = 18, 19
0, Otherwise
(3.45)
• Based on the market price, the system need, and physical constraints of the customer,
the DR cleared for this customer is PDRE16,18 = 3.5 MW and P
DRSR
16,18 = 3.5 MW.
The relationship between the bid/offer quantities and the cleared quantities of the
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Hour (h)
Case 3 DRSRCase 3 DRECase 2 DRE Case 4 DRSR
Figure 3.11: DR dispatch in the energy and spinning reserve market
Fig. 3.11 shows the DR dispatch in the energy market and in the spinning reserve
market (denoted by DRE and DRSR respectively, in Fig. 3.11); it is noted that DR is
dispatched only during the peak load hours 18-22. Since the DR providers also provide
spinning reserve services in Case 3, the DR amount dispatched in the energy market in
this case is lower than in Case 2.
Fig. 3.12 shows the bus-wise dispatch of DR in energy and spinning reserve markets, and






















Case 3 DRSR Case 3 DRE Case 2 DRE Case 4 DRSR
Figure 3.12: Locational dispatch of DR in the energy and spinning reserve market
studies also show that DR can reduce congestion on some lines in certain hours. For
example, line 10-6 is congested during hours 1-4, 7, 8, 10-23 in Case 1, and with DR
dispatch in Case 2 the congestion is relieved at hours 18-22, and at hours 19-22 in Case 3.
Also, congestion on line 24-3 in Case 1 is relieved for four hours during the peak load in




















































































































































































Figure 3.15: Spinning reserve prices (a) Scenario-1 (b) Scenario-2 (c) Scenario-3 (d)
Scenario-4
Fig. 3.13 shows the spinning reserves provided by generators and DR providers in Case
3 and Case 4 (denoted by GSR and DRSR respectively, in Fig. 3.13). It is noted that
while generators provide the lion’s share of spinning reserve requirements, DR providers
supplement this service during the peak load hours 18-21 to help in system reliability.
During hour-18, the share of spinning reserve from DR providers is 11% in Case 3 and 27%
in Case 4, which is fairly significant.
Fig. 3.14(a) shows the LMPs (considering losses) at bus-14 for Scenario-1; since no DR
is dispatched in Case 2, Case 3 and Case 4 between hours 1-17 and 23-24, LMPs are same
at these hours for these cases. However, the LMP reduces significantly during peak hours
18-22, in Case 2, Case 3 and Case 4, more so in Case 2, because of the participation of DR
in energy market only. Thus, it is noted that DR can play a vital role in stabilizing the
market prices, reducing market imperfections and gaming possibilities of generators.
It is noted from the plot of spinning reserve prices for Scenario-1 (Fig. 3.15(a)) that
when DR providers supply this service, in Case 3 and Case 4, the peak hour prices are
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reduced significantly, because of their cheaper offers which replaces the expensive offers
from generators. The price reduction in Case 4 is more prominent because of the larger
quantity of DR quantity dispatched for spinning reserve. In Case 2, there is a reduction
in net demand because DR participates in energy market only, which reduces the spinning
reserve requirement, and hence brings about the dip in spinning reserve price.
Table 3.1: All day market clearing results (considering losses) in Scenario-1
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Generation Dispatch (MWh) 65,585 65,531 65,642 65,738
GSR (MWh) 6,458 6,453 6,353 6,250
DRE (MWh) 0 472 206 0
DRSR (MWh) 0 0 110 223
Demand cleared (MWh) 64,584 65,009 64,850 64,736
Losses (MWh) 1,001 994 998 1,002
Social Welfare ($) 4,462,866 4,471,784 4,468,279 4,464,547
Energy Cost ($) 1,052,727 1,049,178 1,054,010 1,058,159
GSR Cost ($) 32,827 32,801 31,113 29,400
DRE Cost ($) 0 28,350 12,348 0
DRSR Cost ($) 0 0 2,626 4,912
DRE payment ($) 0 34,998 15,658 0
DRSR payment ($) 0 0 2,912 5,018
Table 3.1 presents a summary of market clearing results considering transmission losses.
Case 1 is the base case, with PRD only; the cleared generators meet the cleared demand
taking into account system losses. Case 2 to Case 4 considers both PRD and DR offers
in the energy and spinning reserve markets. In Case 2, the participation of DR in energy
market results in an increase in the cleared demand, but the net demand (i.e. the difference
between cleared demand and DR dispatched for energy services) is reduced, leading to a
reduction in generation, and hence a reduction in energy cost. The social welfare increases,
as expected, and is the highest amongst all cases. The DR payments are high in Case 2,
which makes it more attractive to the load participants to participate in DR provisions.
In Case 3, the DR participates in both energy and spinning reserve markets and ac-
cordingly the DR quantity dispatched in the energy market is reduced, compared to Case
2, resulting in an increase in net demand and generation, and hence an increase in energy
cost. There is a reduction in the spinning reserve cost of generators, because the more ex-
pensive generators which were scheduled for spinning reserves are now replaced by cheaper
DR spinning reserve services. The total DR payment to customers is almost half of that
in Case 2, because the spinning reserve market price is considerably lower than the energy
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market price. The social welfare decreases slightly from Case 2. It can be noted that the
inclusion of DR for energy services helps to reduce the system losses in both Case 2 and
Case 3, albeit marginally.
In Case 4, when DR participates only in spinning reserve services, there is an increase
in the generation and net demand, thus resulting in increased energy cost. The share of
DR in the spinning reserve market is highest among all cases, which helps to bring down
the spinning reserve cost of generators. Since DR provides only spinning reserve services,
the DR payment is the least, which is favorable from the perspective of the ISO. The social
welfare reduces further in this case, from Case 3.
The results indicate that the social welfare increases in Cases 2, 3, and 4 as compared to
Case 1, which justifies that PRD bids and curtailment based DR offers considered together
are more beneficial. It is also noted that although Case 2 results in the highest social wel-
fare, it is not necessarily the most preferred option for the ISO because DR is cleared only
in the energy market. Furthermore, fast response time, high ramp rate, and controllability
of response, which makes DR services desirable options in the spinning reserve market, are
not utilized in Case 2. On the other hand, Case 4 focuses only on the ISO’s perspective
and allocates all the DR service to the spinning reserve market. Consequently, the spinning
reserve market price drops during peak hours and the ISO’s payment burden is the least,
but at a disadvantage to the DR providers. Therefore, considering all the above aspects,
Case 3 presents a more balanced combination of DR participation in the two markets.
Impact of Market Parameters β1
Analysis is carried out to understand the impact of β1 on social welfare and DR payments.
Fig. 3.16 shows the variation of social welfare with variations in the parameter β1 over
the range from 0 to 0.1 (for fixed values of γ1). It is noted that as β1 increases there is an
increase in the social welfare, the social welfare attains a maximum value corresponding
to each chosen value of γ1 and decreases thereafter with further increase in β1. Similarly,
as the parameter β1 increases there is an increase in the DR payments (Fig. 3.17), which
attains a maximum, corresponding to each chosen value of γ1 and decreases thereafter with
further increase in β1.
It can be noted that the social welfare and DR payments are higher when ISO chooses

























































Figure 3.17: DR payments with variation in β1
Impact of Ignoring Transmission Losses
It is important to examine the impact of neglecting transmission losses in an LMP based
market, as losses can account for significant amount of energy.





























Figure 3.18: LMP at bus-14 with and without losses
WL respectively, in Fig. 3.18) at bus-14, for Case 1 and Case 3, for Scenario-1 (normal
operation). It is noted that when losses are neglected the LMPs reduce significantly during
peak hours 18-22 in Case 1-(WL), compared to the case considering losses. This is because
losses being neglected, the generation dispatch is reduced and thus avoiding scheduling
of more expensive generators. While in Case 3-(WL), DR provisions for energy service
results in replacing the expensive generator offers and thus the LMPs are reduced even
more. There is a minimal change in the LMPs between hours 1-17 and 23-24, as losses are
less prominent during off-peak hours.
Fig. 3.19 shows spinning reserve prices considering losses and without losses (denoted
by L and WL respectively, in Fig. 3.19) for Case 1 and Case 3. It is noted that in both Case
1 and Case 3, when losses are neglected, the spinning reserve prices reduce significantly
during peak hours 18-22 in Case 1-(WL), compared to the case considering losses. This is
because with losses being neglected, the generation dispatch is reduced and thus avoiding
avoiding scheduling of expensive generators for spinning reserve services. While in Case
3-(WL), with DR providing spinning reserves, the peak hour spinning reserve prices are
reduced even more because of expensive generator offers for spinning reserves being now
replaced with cheaper DR offers.
Table 3.2 presents a summary of market clearing results without considering losses. It










































Figure 3.19: Spinning reserve prices with and without losses
Table 3.2: All day market clearing results (without losses) in Scenario-1
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Generation Dispatch (MWh) 64,840 64,765 64,858 64,949
GSR (MWh) 6,484 6,476 6,485 6,494
DRE (MWh) 0 473 207 0
DRSR (MWh) 0 0 84 157
Demand cleared (MWh) 64,840 65,238 65,065 64,949
Social Welfare ($) 4,498,858 4,506,558 4,503,336 4,499,836
Energy Cost ($) 1,037,808 1,033,597 1,037,691 1,041,940
GSR Cost ($) 29,199 29,175 27,938 26,831
DRE Cost ($) 0 28,399 12,463 0
DRSR Cost ($) 0 0 1,993 3,479
DRE payment ($) 0 35,058 15,783 0
DRSR payment ($) 0 0 2,312 3,789
cost and thereby an increase in the social welfare, in all four cases, as compared to the cases
when losses are considered. Furthermore, there is not much variation in the DR quantity
cleared for energy provision but the DR quantity cleared for spinning reserve provision is
reduced, thereby leading to reduction in total DR payments.
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3.5.2 Other Scenarios
In Scenario-2, which considers the generator at bus-16 on outage during hours 17-20,
the generation and the cleared demand during these hours are reduced as compared to
Scenario-1. There is a slight increase in the DR dispatch and a change in the location of
DR selections. The demand at bus-14 is mainly supplied by the generator at bus 16. As a
result of outage of this generator, there is a significant increase in the LMP at bus-14 in
Case 3 and Case 4 during these hours compared to the same cases in Scenario-1, whereas
LMP in Case 2 is not much affected since DR is scheduled at bus-14 (Fig. 3.14(b)). The
spinning reserve prices are reduced in Scenario-2 as seen in Fig. 3.15(b), because there
is a reduction in the net demand. The social welfare in all the four cases have decreased
compared to Scenario-1.
In Scenario-3, which considers line 14-11 on outage during hours 16-21, the generation
and cleared demand during these hours are almost same as in Scenario-1. There is a slight
decrease in the amount of DR dispatched in the energy market in Case 2 and Case 3 but
the DR dispatched in the spinning reserve market in Case 3 and Case 4 are considerably
reduced, compared to the same cases in Scenario-1. As a result of the outage, the congestion
on line 16-14 is reduced, thereby reducing the LMP at bus-14 in all cases (Fig. 3.14(c)). It
is also noted that cheaper generators are scheduled for spinning reserve, compared to those
in Scenario-1, thus leading to a reduction in the spinning reserve prices (Fig. 3.15(c)).
In Scenario-4, which considers a 20% demand spike at hours 18 and 19, the total
generation and cleared demand increases during these hours as compared to Scenario-1.
There is an increase in the DR quantity cleared in the energy market by about 25% and
that in the spinning reserve market by about 15%. It is noted that there is a sharp increase
in the LMPs in Case 2, Case 3, and Case 4, compared to Scenario-1 during hours 18 and
19 (Fig. 3.14(d)), because the cleared demand, generation and DR dispatch increases and
which is being supplied by more expensive generators and DR providers. As there is an
increase in the net cleared demand during hours 18 and 19, the total spinning reserve
requirement increases, hence resulting in a sharp increase in the spinning reserve prices
also (Fig. 3.15(d)). The social welfare increased in all the four cases as compared to
Scenario-1.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, a novel and comprehensive formulation of DR provisions through PRD
and load curtailment based DR bids simultaneously, taking into account customer prefer-
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ences for simultaneous participation in energy and spinning reserve markets was proposed.
Various parameters of DR offers and their inter-relationships with the demand offers, and
the clearance of the demand and DR bids were brought out. Based on the proposed novel
bidding structure, a new mathematical model for an LMP-based, loss included, day-ahead,
co-optimized energy and spinning reserve market including DR provisions was proposed.
The effectiveness of the model was validated on the IEEE RTS by considering four case
studies under four scenarios. It was seen that the inclusion of DR reduced the energy prices
and also helped in reducing congestion in the system when it provided energy services.
When the DR provided spinning reserve services, it helped reduce the cost of spinning
reserve service of generators. The DR provisions, simultaneously considering PRD bids
and DR offers, in energy and spinning reserve markets, resulted in increased social welfare.
Thus, the customers were benefited from lowering of energy prices. The integration of DR
in the energy and spinning reserve market enhanced the economic and technical benefits
for the ISO by providing more options for system operation. The impact of selection of
the parameters related to DR offer quantities and cleared DR quantities on social welfare
and DR payments were also examined.
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Chapter 4





e BESS, e ∈ E.
h Blocks of customer bids, h ∈ NCB.
i, q Bus, i ∈ I.
j Generators, j ∈ J .
k, t Time (hour), k ∈ K.
n Blocks of generator offers, n ∈ NGB.
ESi Set of BESS connected to bus i.
Gi Set of generators connected to bus i.
Note: The parameters and variables are listed without their indices, for brevity.
1Parts of this chapter have been submitted for review in: N. Padmanabhan, M. Ahmed, and K. Bhat-




B Element of susceptance matrix, p.u.
BECap Battery energy capacity, MWh.
C1 Degradation cost based on DOD and discharge rate, $/MWh.
a, b, c, d Coefficients of C1.
C2 Battery flexibility cost, $.
CB Battery cost, $.
CCh BESS charging bid price, $/MWh.
CD Customer’s demand bid price, $/MWh.
CESR Spinning reserve offer price of BESS, $/MWh.
CG Generator offer price for energy, $/MWh.
CGSR Generator spinning reserve offer price, $/MW.
Csd, Csu Shut-down/ start-up cost of generator, $.
DCRmax Maximum discharge rate limit of BESS, p.u.
DCRmin Minimum discharge rate limit of BESS, p.u.










Demand bid/ Generator offer quantity, MW.
P
GSR
Generator spinning reserve offer quantity, MW.
SOC, SOC Maximum/minimum SOC limit of BESS, p.u..
α Fraction of battery cost accounting its flexibility characteristic.
βCh, βDch BESS charging/discharging capacity share, as a fraction of the available
BESS energy capacity.
βSR BESS offer quantity share, for spinning reserve, as a fraction of avail-
able BESS energy capacity.
η Battery round trip efficiency, %.
ηCh, ηDch Battery Charging/discharging trip efficiency, %.
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Variables
DCR Discharge rate of the BESS, p.u.
ECh Charging energy, MWh.
PChE, PDchE Charging/discharging power, MW.
PESR Spinning reserve from BESS, MW.
PD, PG Cleared demand/generation, MW.
PGSR Spinning reserve cleared from generator, MW.
P loss Power loss in the transmission line, MW.
SOC State of charge, p.u.
SOCDch SOC after the discharging operation, MWh.
SOCSR Energy capacity of the BESS cleared for spinning reserve provision,
p.u.
SOCSRcap BESS cleared capacity for spinning reserve, MWh.
Uj,k, Vj,k Binary variable = 1, if generator starts/shut downs, and 0 otherwise.
WG, W SR Binary variable = 1, if energy/spinning reserve offer of generator is
cleared, and 0 otherwise.
X Binary variable = 1, if demand bid is cleared, and 0 otherwise.
Z1, Z2 Binary variable = 1, if BESS is charging/discharging, and 0 otherwise.
Z3 Binary variable = 1, if BESS is providing spinning reserve provision,
and 0 otherwise.
δ Voltage angle of the bus, radian.
4.2 Introduction
Recently some policy interventions have taken place for increasing the ESS participation
in electricity markets. For example, the FERC Order 841 [14] requires that ISOs facilitate
the participation of ESSs in energy, ancillary services, and capacity markets, by including
the ESS bidding parameters that represent their physical and operational characteristics.
However, there are still many challenges associated with the implementation of this Order.
For example, in the existing market frameworks that allow BESSs to participate by bidding
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in electricity markets, the bids and offers do not explicitly represent the physical and
operational characteristics such as the SOC, discharge rate, degradation, etc.
In the view of aforementioned challenges, this chapter first presents a novel BESS cost
function model, considering Degradation Cost, based on DOD and discharge rate, and
Flexibility Cost, in terms of the battery P/E ratio. The model is developed considering
Lithium-ion batteries, and the approach can be applied to other conventional electrochem-
ical batteries, but not flow batteries. A detailed bid/offer structure based on the proposed
cost functions is formulated. Thereafter, a new framework and mathematical model for
BESS participation in an LMP-based, co-optimized, day-ahead energy and spinning re-
serve market, are developed. Three case studies are presented to investigate the impact of
BESS participation on system operation and market settlement. The proposed model is
validated on the IEEE RTS to demonstrate its functionalities.
4.3 BESS Cost Function Model
The special characteristics of a BESS enables it to participate in the electricity markets
both as a load and a generator, and hence the BESS can submit bids to charge and offers
to discharge. The bids and offers should reflect the marginal operating cost of the BESS.
Furthermore, the BESS can also participate in reserve markets by providing its capacity, in
the form of a discharge offer; the discharging quantity can be available during both charging
and discharging operations. The following aspects need be taken into consideration in
developing the operating cost function of a BESS:
• When a BESS participates in the electricity market, its charging / discharging profiles
are expected to be significantly different from those considered in its testing phase.
Therefore, it is important to take into account the variable, and usage dependent,
BESS degradation characteristics in the cost model.
• BESSs are capable of providing a high degree of operational flexibility, which makes
them competent ancillary service resources. It is necessary to consider the value of
flexibility in their operating cost model.
• BESSs being limited energy sources, it is more realistic to formulate their cost func-
tions and bids/offers in terms of their energy capacity or SOC, instead of power
quantities.
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It is to be noted that among the aforementioned aspects, the battery degradation
mechanism has the most significant impact on the operational cost of a BESS and thus it is
very important to capture it in the cost. The battery degradation is dependent on factors
such as the DOD, discharge rate, limits on SOC, ambient temperature, etc., and these
dependencies are nonlinear in nature. In order to reduce battery degradation modeling
complexity, the following assumptions are made: (i) the impact of high temperature is
disregarded as all BESSs have an appropriate climate control system; (ii) the impact of
SOC limits is minimal, by appropriate choice of the minimum/maximum limits on SOC;
(iii) assuming that the BESS charging and discharging energies are identical over a day’s
cycle, battery degradation only occurs during the discharge stage of the cycle, and the
charging half cycle causes no cycle aging [61].
Thus, the operations cost of a BESS is comprised of the following components: (i)
Degradation Cost Based on DOD and discharge Rate, (ii) Flexibility Cost (iii) Spinning
Reserve Cost.
4.3.1 Degradation Cost Based on DOD and Discharge Rate
In this work, we model battery degradation based on two important factors: DOD and
discharge rate. When considering the BESS degradation due to DOD, an important factor
to be considered is from what level of SOC the battery starts discharging and to what level
it reaches at the end of the discharging interval. For example, let us consider two cases of
battery discharge: (i) SOC of 100% to 40% (ii) SOC of 80% to 20%. Although the DOD
in both cases is 60%, the degradation is more severe in case (ii), as per [96]. Hence it
is very important to capture the impact of starting and ending levels of the SOC on the
degradation cost. Furthermore, it is to be noted that it is a common practice to use the
SOC as the state variable in BESS operation models rather than the DOD [53,60].
In the context of ESS participating in the electricity markets, the ISOs typically adopt
two modes: (i) ISO-monitored energy level mode, (ii) self-monitored energy level mode
[35, 97]. In the former mode of participation, the SOC, and lower/ upper storage limits
of the ESS are available to ISO, to ensure that the storages’ schedules in the day-ahead
and real-time markets are feasible within their operating limits. In the latter mode of
participation, the ESSs themselves manage their energy level constraints, thus do not
participate by providing their SOC level or other operating limits to the ISO. For example,
in NYISO [35] both modes are available for the ESS to participate in the market, while in
MISO [97], the ESSs participate only through ISO monitored energy level mode. In the
proposed work, we consider that the SOC of the battery is known and monitored by the
market operator, as practiced in NYISO.
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The second important factor contributing the battery degradation are the high charging
and discharging currents. In this work, the discharge rate of a battery, denoted by DCR,




= ∆SOCk ∀k ∈ K (4.1)
Since a 1-hour time interval is considered, i.e., T = 1.
In this work, discharge rate is represented in terms of ’C’, where 1C denotes the full
discharge of the battery in 1-hour, 2C the full discharge in 30 minutes, 3C the full discharge


















Figure 4.1: Relationship between number of cycles and DOD, for discharge rate of 1C
[97,98]
In order to model the battery degradation correctly, it is important to understand the
impact of DOD and discharge rate on the number of cycles. The relationship of DOD with
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battery cycle life for a Lithium ion battery (at a given temperature and discharge rate)
shown in Fig. 4.1, is obtained through tests and are provided by the battery manufacturer
[98], [99].
The relationship between cycle life and DOD for the Lithium ion battery as per the
curve in Fig.1 can be expressed as follows:
L(D) = γD−ω (4.2)
where, γ and ω, are coefficients capturing the relationship between the number of cycles
























Figure 4.2: Cycle life loss versus discharge rate [99]
Similarly, the relationship between cycle life loss and discharge rate for the Lithium
ion battery is shown in Fig. 4.2 [100]. It can be noted from Fig. 4.2, the impact of
discharge rate on the cycle life is almost linear for discharge rates up to 3C and thereafter





















Figure 4.3: Relationship between number of cycles and DOD, for different discharge rates
values of discharge rates, the relationship between the number of cycles and DOD for
various discharge rates can be developed, and represented as shown in Fig. 4.3.
Now, taking into account the impact of starting and ending levels of the SOC, before
and after the discharge operation, the Degradation Cost (C1k) for a particular discharge





((1− SOCk)ω − (1− SOCk−1)ω) ∀k ∈ K (4.3)
Using (4.3), for different possible values of SOCk and SOCk−1 and discharge rate, the
battery degradation cost for various scenarios can be generated and represented as shown
in Fig. 4.4; where each layer represents the Degradation Cost corresponding to various
DOD, expressed in terms of SOCk and SOCk−1, and a particular discharge rate.
It is to be noted that C1k in (4.3) is a nonlinear function of DOD and discharge rate,






































Figure 4.4: Degradation Cost for various DOD and discharge rates
obtain a cost function which can be easily integrated to a market model, the Degradation
Cost function (4.3) can be linearized using the well known multi-linear regression method,
and expressed as follows:
C1k = aSOCk + bSOCk−1 + cDCRk + d ∀k ∈ K (4.4)
where, a, b, c and d are the coefficients of the Degradation Cost based on DOD and
discharge rate.
It can be noted that the proposed Degradation Cost model of BESS is time dependent
unlike the generator cost models, to account for the fact that the costs are based on DOD,
SOC, and discharge rate, which are also time dependent.
In order to compare the accuracy of the linear regression model in (4.4) with a non-
linear regression model, a non-linear regression analysis with the same data was carried
out. It was noted that the ’Adjusted R-square’ parameter, which measures the goodness
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of fit of a multi-variable regression, was 0.8657 in linear regression and 0.9319 in nonlinear
regression, which are very close. Furthermore, the corresponding ’Standard Error’ values,
which provide a measure of the variation of the estimated points from the actuals, were
5.17% and 3.79%, respectively, which are also close. Thus the linearized model used in
(4.4) adequately represents the functional relationships between the Degradation Cost,
DOD and the discharge rate.
Figure 4.5: (a) Battery Pack Cost versus P/E ratio [99] (b) Battery Cost and Flexibility
Cost versus P/E ratio
4.3.2 Flexibility Cost
The flexibility feature of a battery is characterized by its ability to act both as a generation
source and a load, and by its high response rate, i.e., to provide energy in a very short
time interval. The BESS have significant advantages over conventional generators because
of their high flexibility in response rates i.e., the time required to charge or discharge,
which is in milliseconds. It is to be noted that the flexibility attribute of a BESS is largely
dependent on the P/E ratio of the BESS. This is evident from considering batteries (with
same energy capacity but different power ratings) with different P/E ratios; the one with
high P/E ratio will deliver proportionately more energy than the battery with a lower P/E
ratio, for very short durations, because of its higher power rating. It may thus be inferred
that the battery with high P/E ratio has greater flexibility. Furthermore, as noted in [101]
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and Fig. 4.5(a), the P/E ratio has a direct impact on the cost of the BESS. Hence, the
Flexibility Cost of the BESS can be given as follows:
C2 = αCB (4.5)
where, α is a fraction of the battery cost accounting for its flexibility characteristic and
CB is the battery cost in $, as a function of its P/E ratio. A plot of the battery cost versus
P/E ratio, for a 10 MWh battery, using the relation of [101] is given in Fig. 4.5(b). As
per our proposition, the Flexibility Cost (C2) is considered to be a proportional fraction
of the battery cost, as given in equation (4.5), and hence it will also be a function of the
P/E ratio of the battery, as shown in Fig. 4.5(b).
4.3.3 Spinning Reserve Cost
The BESS can also participate in the spinning reserve market by providing its capacity,
in the form of an offer. However, when the BESS provides spinning reserve, it forgoes the
opportunity to participate in the energy-only market. Therefore, the opportunity cost of
not participating in energy-only markets can be attributed to the spinning reserve cost
of the BESS. The spinning reserve cost of the BESS is its opportunity cost, which is the
difference in its revenue earnings from its participation in energy-only market with that in
a co-optimized energy and spinning reserve market.
Assuming the BESS revenue in the co-optimized market is 75% of its earnings in energy-
only market, its opportunity cost, and hence the spinning reserve cost, would be 25% of
the revenue. Since the market price is unknown at the bidding stage, we assume that
the spinning reserve cost is 25% of the BESS operations cost (C1k). In the context of
conventional generators providing spinning reserves, similar assumptions on the cost of
spinning reserve have been made in [55], [102].
The BESS can offer spinning reserve when it is operating in discharging mode, charging
mode or idle mode. While offering spinning reserve in the day-ahead market, the BESS
would commit a reserve capacity. If this capacity is called or activated in real time, then
in charging mode it would have to reduce that much capacity from its charging level and
act as a demand response, while in, discharging mode it would have to additionally supply
that reserve quantity, like a generation resource. And during its idle mode, the BESS can
commit the capacity and provide reserve by either charging or discharging, if required.
Furthermore, when required to deploy its reserve in real-time operation, the BESS will
additionally receive the energy market price for the quantity of energy it supplied.
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It is to be noted that flow batteries have a completely different degradation characteris-
tic as compared to conventional electrochemical batteries (such as Lithium-ion, Lead-acid,
Nickel-based, etc.,). In fact, it can be said that flow batteries have very low degrada-
tion [103]. Therefore, the proposed operational cost function model of the BESS is not
applicable to flow batteries. In [99] battery characteristic curves and models for battery
loss of life as a function of DOD, are presented for Lithium-ion and a few other conventional
electrochemical batteries such as Lead-acid and Nickel metal halide. Since the Lead-acid
and Nickel-based models in [99] are similar to Lithium-ion model, although varying in the
mathematical function type, the proposed approach to model the operational cost of the
Lithium-ion battery can be extended to these conventional electrochemical batteries. In
this work, Lithium-ion batteries are considered because these are most widely used for
grid-scale applications.
4.4 Proposed Structure of BESS Charging Bids and
Discharging Offers
It is proposed that a grid-scale, independently owned BESS, will participate in the energy
and spinning reserve markets in three ways (i) buy energy during charging operation, (ii)
sell energy during discharging operation, and (iii) provide capacity in spinning reserve
market during both charging or discharging operations. Accordingly, the BESS owner will
submit bids to charge and offers to discharge, in the energy market, and offers to discharge
and hence provide reserve capacity in the spinning reserve market. The structure of BESS
bids/offers are discussed next.
4.4.1 Charging Bids
Charging Price
It is assumed that the BESS will seek to maximize the possibilities of energy arbitrage for
making profit, hence it will submit a high charging bid price, such that it is cleared in the
market during charging operation, to procure sufficient energy which it can discharge when
the market price is high.
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Charging Quantity
This is limited by a parameter βChe,k denoting the fraction of BESS capacity available for




The BESS owner submits offers to the energy market using C1k in terms of the coefficients
a, b, c and d, as per (4.4).
Discharging Quantity
This is limited by a parameter βDche,k denoting the fraction of BESS capacity available for
discharging. The BESS submits the βDche,k parameter as its discharging quantity offer in the
energy market.
4.4.3 Flexibility Offers
The BESS owner submits the Flexibility offers to the market operator in terms of the Flex-
ibility Cost parameter α, and the battery cost CB, as per (4.5). Note that the Flexibility
offers are submitted for both charging and discharging operation of the BESS.
4.4.4 Spinning Reserve Offers
The BESS submits price-quantity offers to provide capacity in the spinning reserve mar-
ket, during both charging and discharging operation, a price CESR and a parameter βSRe,k
denoting the fraction of the BESS capacity available for spinning reserve provision.
Table 4.1 presents a summary of all the BESS bid/offer parameters submitted by the
BESS owners to the market operator, and their respective interpretations.
The ISO receives bids and offers from the various market participants. The loads
submit the energy buy bids and the generators submit energy and spinning reserve offers.
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Table 4.1: Interpretation of BESS bid/offer parameters
BESS Bid/Offer Parameters Interpretation
a, b Accounts for the impact of the DOD on the battery cycle life, which in turn affects the
Degradation Cost.
c Accounts for the impact of the discharge rate on the battery cycle, which in turn affects
the Degradation Cost.
d Linearization offset term in Degradation cost, depending on battery capacity.
C2 Flexiblity Cost of the battery represented as a fraction (α) of the battery cost (CB)
accounting for its flexibility characteristic.
βCh, βDch, βSR Denotes the fraction of the available battery capacity that is bid/offered for charging,
discharging and spinning reserve, respectively.
The structure of the demand bids and conventional generator offers are assumed to be as
considered in [21]. The BESS submit the charging bids the discharging offers for providing
energy and spinning reserve service, as per the structure discussed earlier. With these
inputs, the energy and spinning reserve markets are simultaneously cleared using the novel
and comprehensive joint optimization model, discussed in Section 4.5. The outcomes of
the market settlement include the dispatch schedules, UC decisions, and market prices.
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4.5 Proposed Day-Ahead Market Model Including
BESS
Objective Function




















































































The gross surplus of customers and the BESS during charging, is represented in (a), the
total cost of generators, which includes the generator start-up cost and shut-down cost,
and the energy cost is represented in (b). The cost of spinning reserve provisions from
generators is represented in (c), the cost of BESS for energy provisions during discharging,
accounting for degradation based on DOD and discharge rate is given in (d), the Flexibility
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Cost considered during the charging and discharging operation is given in (e). The cost
of spinning reserve provision from the BESS during discharging, is represented in (f). The
objective function in (4.6) is subjected to the following constraints,
Demand Supply Balance
These constraints are formulated using the dc load flow equations to ensure a balance













0.5P lossi,q +Bi,q(δi,k − δq,k)
)
∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (4.7)
The transmission line losses are included in the dc load flow equations using the ap-
proach discussed in [21].
Market Clearing Constraints
These constraints ensure that the cleared demand bids and generator energy and spinning
reserve offers do not exceed their respective maximum bid and offer quantities.
PDh,i,k ≤ P
D










n,j,k ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K, ∀n ∈ NGB (4.10)
BESS Energy Arbitrage Constraints
The following constraints ensure that the charging and discharging quantities cleared from
a BESS are within its maximum bid and offer capacity.
SOCe,k − SOCe,k−1
≤ βChe,k (SOCe − SOCe,k−1) + (1− Z1e,k)SOCe
∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.11)
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SOCe,k−1 − SOCe,k
≤ βDche,k (SOCe,k−1 − SOCSRe,k−1 − SOCe) + (1− Z2e,k)SOCe
∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.12)
During the charging operation (Z1e,k=1 and Z2e,k=0), (4.11) becomes a binding con-
straint and (4.12) is a redundant constraint; thus (4.11) would be activated to ensure
that the charging quantity cleared from a BESS is within its maximum bid capacity; and
similarly, during discharging operation (Z1e,k=0 and Z2e,k=1), and vice-versa applies.
The SOC of a BESS at the end of the discharging operation need be within the limits
and are ensured by the following constraints,
SOCe B
E
Cap,e Z2e,k ≤ SOCDche,k ≤ SOCe BECap,e Z2e,k ∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.13)
where, the SOC after the discharging operation are obtained from the following,
SOCe,k B
E
Cap,e − (1− Z2e,k) SOCe BECap,e ≤ SOCDche,k
≤ SOCe,k BECap,e − (1− Z2e,k) SOCe BECap,e
∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.14)
During the discharging operation (Z2e,k=1), (4.14) determines the value of the SOC of
the BESS at the end of the discharge interval and (4.13) ensures that the SOC is within
its limits.
The cleared energy during charging operation is obtained as follows,
(SOCe,k − SOCe,k−1)BECap,e − (1− Z1e,k) SOCe BECap,e
≤ EChe,k
≤ (SOCe,k − SOCe,k−1)BECap,e + (1− Z1e,k) SOCe BECap,e
∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.15)
SOCe B
E
Cap,e Z1e,k ≤ EChe,k ≤ SOCe BECap,e Z1e,k ∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.16)
During the charging operation (Z1e,k=1), (4.15) determines the value of the cleared
energy of the BESS and (4.16) ensures that the cleared energy is within its limits.
The discharge rate of the battery is limited by its maximum/minimum discharge rate
limits, given by,
DCRmine,k Z2e,k ≤ DCRe,k ≤ DCRmaxe,k Z2e,k
∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.17)
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where the DCR is obtained from the following:
(SOCe,k−1 − SOCe,k)− (1− Z2e,k) DCRmaxe,k
≤ DCRe,k
≤ (SOCe,k−1 − SOCe,k) + (1− Z2e,k)DCRmine,k
∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.18)
During the discharging operation (Z2e,k=1), (4.18) determines the value of the discharge
rate of the BESS and (4.17) ensures that the discharge rate is within its limits.
BESS Spinning Reserve Market Clearing Constraints
The cleared spinning reserve capacity from a BESS should not exceed its maximum offer
quantity.
SOCSRe,k ≤ βSRe,k SOCe Z3e,k ∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.19)
The cleared spinning reserve capacity from a BESS is obtained from the following,
SOCSRe,k B
E
Cap,e − (1− Z3e,k) SOCe BECap,e ≤ SOC
SRcap
e,k
≤ SOCSRe,k BECap,e − (1− Z3e,k) SOCe BECap,e
∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.20)
If the BESS is cleared to provide spinning reserve (Z3e,k=1), (4.20) determines the
value of the cleared spinning reserve capacity from the BESS and (4.19) ensures that the
cleared spinning reserve is within its limits.
BESS Operational Constraints
These include the energy balance, the limits on the SOC, charging/discharging power and




Ch − PDchEe,k /ηDch + SOCe,k−1
∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.21)
SOCe + SOC
SR
e,k ≤ SOCe,k ≤ SOCe ∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.22)
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0 ≤ PChEe,k ≤ P
Ch
e Z1e,k ∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K, (4.23)
0 ≤ PDchEe,k ≤ P
Dch
e Z2e,k ∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.24)
Z1e,k + Z2e,k ≤ 1 ∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.25)
System Spinning Reserve Constraints
These constraints ensure that the system spinning reserve requirement is met for each
hour. It is assumed that the total system spinning reserve requirement is 10% of the gross













∀k ∈ K (4.26)
Where, PGSRj,k ≤ P j − PGj,k ∀j ∈ J,∀k ∈ K (4.27)





Cap,e ∀e ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (4.28)
Transmission Line Constraints
These constraints ensure that the line power flows are within their limits.
Bi,q(δi,k − δq,k) ≤ PFlowi,q ∀i, q ∈ I (4.29)
Other Constraints
These constraints include generation limits, ramp-up/down constraints, minimum-up /
down time constraints, coordination constraints, and line flow constraints, as discussed in
Chapter 3 and not presented here for brevity.
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4.6 Results & Discussions
To validate the proposed BESS integrated energy and spinning reserve market model, a
slightly modified version of the IEEE RTS [94] is considered, which includes 32 generators,
loads at 17 buses, and 37 transmission lines. There are 10 BESS units with total capacity
of 250 MW/240 MWh spread over 5 buses as follows:
• ES1, ES2 at Bus-4, each with capacity of [30 MW, 15 MWh]
• ES3, ES4 at Bus-5, each with capacity of [30 MW, 30 MWh]
• ES5, ES6 at Bus-9, each with capacity of [25 MW, 50 MWh]
• ES7, ES8 at Bus-19, each with capacity of [20 MW, 12.5 MWh]
• ES9, ES10 at Bus-20, each with capacity of [20 MW, 12.5 MWh]
The loads at each bus are scaled up by 25% from the given data. The demand bids and
generator offers for energy and spinning reserves are chosen as given in [104]. The BESS
owners submit bids and offers for participating in the energy and spinning reserve markets,
as discussed in Section 4.4.
The proposed model is formulated as a MIP problem and solved using the CPLEX
solver [105] in GAMS [95]. To order to study the impact of BESS participation on market
settlement and system operation, three case studies are considered as follows:
• Case 1: Base case without BESS participation.
• Case 2: BESS participation, simple bid/offer model.
• Case 3: BESS participation, proposed bid/offer model.
In Case 2 the BESS bids/offers do not take into account the degradation and flexibility
costs, and are solely based on market price forecasts. For the purpose of present studies,
high charging bid prices and low discharging offer prices are considered. In Case 3, the
values of the BESS bidding parameters are as follows: a = −36.23, b = 34.80, c = 2.77,
d = −2.45, η = 0.9, α = 0.000003 to 0.000005, βCh = βDch = 0.5 to 1, βSR = 0.1 to 0.2,
DCR = 1, which are chosen based on the discussions in Section 4.3, and [98–100].
Table 4.2 presents an aggregated summary of market clearing results. In Case 1, the
cleared generators meet the cleared demand plus the system losses. In Case 2 & 3, there is
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Table 4.2: All day aggregate market clearing results
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Energy cleared (MWh) 67,923 67,984 68,064
Generation dispatch (MWh) 68,928 69,059 69,103
BESS charging energy (MWh) - 331 249
BESS discharging energy (MWh) - 299 221
Losses (MWh) 1,005 1,043 1,011
BESS charging cost ($) - 17,907 12,721
BESS degradation cost, C1 ($) - - 7,352
BESS flexibility cost, C2 ($) - - 1,547
BESS spinning reserve cost ($) - 7,582 6,952
BESS energy market revenue ($) - 23,115 16,447
BESS spinning reserve market revenue ($) - 15,458 15,037
BESS profit ($) - 13,084 10,264
Social Welfare ($) 4,716,866 4,769,135 4,771,524
a slight increase in the generation, which is to meet the additional BESS charging demand
and the increased losses. However, as a result of BESS participation in the energy market,
the cheaper BESS discharging offers could replace some of the expensive generators. Note
that the charging/ discharging energy is more in Case 2 compared to Case 3. This is
because, in Case 3 the Degradation Cost and Flexibility Cost are accounted for, which
limits the clearing of charging and discharging quantities from the BESS. It should also
be noted that, when battery Degradation Cost is accounted for, it helps in the economic
operation of the BESS and increases years of useful operation.
It is noted that the participation of BESS (Case 2 and Case 3) has resulted in an
increase in the social welfare of the system, more so in Case 3, compared to Case 1 and
Case 2. Although the profit in Case 2 is higher, compared to Case 3, it should be noted that
Case 3 correctly captures the actual cost of BESS operation, accounting for its degradation
and flexibility attributes, thus providing realistic market clearing decisions, from the view
point of both the ISO and BESS owners.
Fig. 4.6 shows the LMPs at bus-18 for the three cases; the LMP reduces during the two
peak periods (hours 10-16 and 18-20) in Case 2 & 3 because of the cheaper BESS charging
offers in the energy market. The reduction is more significant (upto 33% at hour-14 and













































Figure 4.7: Generation dispatch over 24 hours in Case 1 and Case 3
It is noted from Fig. 4.7 that in Case 3 the dispatched generation is slightly higher than
in Case 1 during the hours 11-20. This is because there is a slight increase in the cleared
demand during these hours as a result of BESS participation with lower priced discharge
offers.
Fig. 4.8 shows the aggregated charging and discharging power from all BESS units, in
Case 3 on an hourly basis. It is noted that BESS charging takes place mainly during the
off peak hours 3-8, while the discharging occurs mainly during the peak hours 11-12 and





































BESS 1 BESS 3 BESS 6 BESS 9 BESS 10
Figure 4.9: SOC profiles of BESS after market dispatch in Case 3
The SOC profiles of randomly chosen five BESS units in Case 3 are shown in Fig. 4.9.
It is noted that the BESS units have varying charging and discharging profiles because of
their locational placement and the variations in theirs cost components which determine























Figure 4.10: Spinning reserve market clearing price
It is noted that the spinning reserve prices (Fig. 4.10) in Case 3, the spinning reserve
prices are significantly reduced in hours 10-16 and 18-20, because the cheaper offers from
BESS have replaced some of the expensive generator offers in Case 1.
Fig. 4.11 shows the contracted spinning reserve capacity in Case 1 (from generators
only) and Case 3 (from generators and BESS). It is noted that in Case 3, while the
generators provide the significant share of the spinning reserve requirements, BESS is
able to provide about 8% of system spinning reserve requirement and thus providing more
options to the ISO. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the BESS provides spinning
reserve during charging operations also (hours 1, 2, 6, and 7) apart from the discharging
operation hours, which may be perceived as a demand response provision.
4.7 Conclusions
In this Chapter, a novel BESS cost function model was proposed that considers Degrada-
tion Cost, based on the DOD and discharge rate, and Flexibility Cost, in terms of battery
cost, as a function of its P/E ratio. The model was developed considering Lithium-ion
batteries, and the approach can be applied to other conventional electrochemical batteries,
but not flow batteries. A detailed charging bid and discharging offer structure based on
the proposed cost functions was formulated. Subsequently, a new framework and mathe-





































































Figure 4.11: Spinning reserve contracted over 24 hours in Case 1 and Case 3
reserve market was developed. The effectiveness of the BESS inclusive market model was
validated on the IEEE RTS and compared with two other realistic market structures: (a)
traditional structure with only generator and load participation (b) BESS bidding as the
generator/load with price quantity pair. BESS participation using the proposed cost func-
tion and bid/offer structure resulted in a higher social welfare than when no BESS was
present or with a simple bid/offer structure for BESS, based on market price expectations.
The participation of BESS also reduced energy and spinning reserve prices when it pro-
vided services in the energy and spinning reserve markets. Overall, the inclusion of BESS
in the electricity markets has resulted in improving the economic and technical benefits for
the ISO by providing more options for system operation.
The advantages of the proposed work are that: (i) it correctly captured the actual cost
of BESS operation, accounting for its degradation and flexibility attributes, thus providing
realistic market clearing decisions, (ii) it appropriately met the important requirement of
FERC Order 841 to develop a participation model for ESS, accounting for their physical
and operational characteristics such as the SOC, discharge rate, etc., in the ESS bidding
parameters, to facilitate their participation in ISO markets.
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Chapter 5





e BESS, e ∈ E.
i, q Bus, i ∈ I.
j Generators, j ∈ J .
s Scenario, s ∈ S; S = [S0, S1, S2].
S0 Set of normal operation scenarios, S0 ∈ S.
S1 Set of contingency scenarios, S1 ∈ S.
S2 Set of load deviation scenarios, S2 ∈ S.
ESi Set of BESS connected to bus i.
Gi Set of generators connected to bus i.
Note: All parameters and variables pertain to the real-time market unless they are
explicitly stated to be day-ahead with superscript ‘DA’.
1Parts of this chapter have been submitted for review in: N. Padmanabhan, K. Bhattacharya, and
M. Ahmed, “Battery energy storage systems for primary and secondary regulation in real-time electricity
markets, IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 2019.
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Parameters
B Element of susceptance matrix, p.u.
CCh,CDch BESS charging/discharging bid/offer price, $/MWh.
CD Customer’s demand bid price, $/MWh.
CEPRU,CEPRD Primary regulation up/down offer price of BESS, $/MWh.
CESRU,CESRD Secondary regulation up/down offer price of BESS, $/MWh.
CG Generator offer price for energy, $/MWh.
CGPRU, CGPRD Generator primary regulation up/down offer price, $/MWh.





Maximum charging/discharging energy capacity of BESS, MWh.
ECh,DA, EDch,DA Charging/discharging energy cleared in day-ahead (DA) market, MWh.
E
Dn
Maximum offer by a BESS for ‘down’ services (i.e., charging, primary-











Maximum secondary regulation up/down energy capacity of BESS,
MWh.
ESR,DA Spinning reserve capacity cleared from BESS in DA market, MWh.
E
Up
Maximum offer by a BESS for ‘up’ services (i.e., discharging, primary-
up and secondary-up regulation), MWh.
P , P Maximum/minimum limit on power output of generator, MW.
PChE,DA, PDchE,DA Charging/discharging power in DA market, MW.
PD,DA Demand cleared from generator in day-ahead market, MW.
PDev-Dn/Up Load deviations, MW.
P
Dn
Maximum offer by a generator for ‘down’ services (i.e., primary-down
and secondary-down regulation), MW.
PG,DA Generation cleared from generator in day-ahead market , MW.





















Maximum secondary regulation up/down power of BESS, MW.
















Maximum offer by a generator for ‘up’ services (i.e., energy, primary-
up and secondary-up regulation), MW.
Re BESS droop, Hz/MW.
Req Total droop in the system, Hz/MW.
Rj Generator droop, Hz/MW.
RU , RD Ramp up/down limit of generator, MW/min.
SOC, SOC Maximum/minimum SOC limit of BESS, MWh.
SOC0 SOC of battery at the start of each interval of real-time market set-
tlement, MWh.
WDA Commitment status of generator in DA market, equals 1, if energy
offer of is cleared, and 0 otherwise.
XDA Clearing status of demand in DA market, equals 1, if demand bid is
cleared in DA market, and 0 otherwise.
Z1DA, Z2DA Operational status of BESS in DA market, equals 1, if BESS is charg-
ing/discharging, and 0 otherwise.
α Share of the different offered generator quantities, as a fraction of the
maximum generator offer for ‘down’/‘up’ services.
γ Share of the different offered BESS quantities, as a fraction of the
maximum BESS offer for ‘down’/‘up’ services.
∆fmin, ∆fmax Minimum/maximum frequency deviation, Hz.
∆k Market settlement interval, hour.
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η Battery round trip efficiency, %.
ηCh, ηDch Battery Charging/discharging efficiency, %.
ρs Probability of occurrence of scenario s.
ρ0 Probability that none of the contingencies occur.
Variables
ECh, EDch Charging/discharging energy, MWh.
EPRU, EPRD Primary regulation up/down energy from BESS, MWh.
ESRU, ESRD Secondary regulation up/down energy from BESS, MWh.
PChE, PDchE Charging/discharging power, MW.
PEPRU, PEPRD Primary regulation up/down power from BESS, MW.
PESRU, PESRD Secondary regulation up/down power from BESS, MW.
PD, PG Cleared demand/generation, MW.
PGPRU, PGPRD Primary regulation up/down from generator, MW.
PGSRU, PGSRD Secondary regulation up/down from generator, MW.
P loss Power loss in the transmission line, MW.
SOC State of charge, MWh.
WGRU, WGRD Binary variable = 1, if regulation up/down offer/bid of generator is
cleared, and 0 otherwise.
ZERU, ZERD Binary variable = 1, if regulation up/down offer/bid of BESS is
cleared, and 0 otherwise.
δ Voltage angle of the bus, radian.
∆f frequency deviation, Hz.
5.2 Introduction
Electricity market operations are subject to various uncertainties arising due to increas-
ing penetration of intermittent and non-dispatchable RES, contingencies such as loss of
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generators and transmission lines, and sudden load deviations. Accordingly, the genera-
tion and loads are dispatched through real-time markets to meet the system demand more
accurately vis-a-vis the day-ahead market, and also to procure and deploy primary and
secondary regulation reserves. In the previous chapter, BESS were considered as day-ahead
market participants, providing energy and spinning reserves service. However, in recent
years, BESSs have been considered as promising resources to provide regulation services
because of their operational flexibility, as compared to conventional resources.
To this effect, in this chapter, a novel framework and mathematical model are proposed
for simultaneously procuring primary and secondary regulation reserves alongside energy,
in a BESS integrated electricity market, by taking into account probabilistic scenarios of
contingencies in the real-time operations. Two case studies, each considering four contin-
gency and two load deviation scenarios, are presented to investigate the impact of BESS
participation on system operation and market settlement. The proposed model is validated
on the IEEE RTS to demonstrate its functionalities.
5.3 Proposed Real-time Market Framework Including
BESS
The proposed real-time market will dispatch the BESS alongside generators and loads to
meet the incremental energy needs vis-a-vis the day-ahead market, and the primary and
secondary regulation reserve requirements. The real-time market is coupled with the day-
ahead market and thus to correctly capture the interactions, the following assumptions are
made:
• Only participants cleared in the day-ahead market can participate in the real-time
market.
• The day-ahead market is settled a priori and the UC and dispatch schedules are
already available before the real-time market clearing.
The loads will submit bids to buy energy, generators will submit offers/bids for energy
and regulation reserves, over and above their day-ahead settlements, and BESS will sub-
mit charging bids, discharging offers and offers for reserve provisions. The ISO will receive
detailed information on the bids and offers, in price-quantity pairs, from all market par-






















































Figure 5.1: BESS integrated real-time market framework
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Based on these inputs, the proposed market is simultaneously cleared and the outcomes,
which include the dispatch schedules for all entities, and market prices, are obtained. The




Figure 5.2: Generator offer quantities in real-time energy and regulation reserve markets,
(a) up-services, (b) down-services
The maximum offer by a generator j for ‘up’ services (i.e., energy, primary-up and
secondary-up regulation) for a particular real-time market interval, is based on its scheduled








j ∀j ∈ J (5.1)
P
up
j ≤ RUj ∀j ∈ J (5.2)
The individual components of the generator offer quantities for energy, primary-up and
secondary-up regulation are limited by the parameters α1, α2, and α3, which denote the
maximum share of these components as a fraction of P
up













j ∀j ∈ J (5.3)
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Fig. 5.2(a) shows the total available capacity for ‘up’ services (P
up
j ) from a generator in
the real-time market, the components for various services, and also the day-ahead market
commitments.
The maximum bid by a generator j for ‘down’ services (i.e., primary-down and secondary-
down regulation) for a particular real-time market interval, is based on its scheduled day-
ahead energy dispatch and minimum generator capacity, and is limited by its ramping





j − P j ∀j ∈ J (5.4)
P
Dn
j ≤ RDj ∀j ∈ J (5.5)
The individual components of the generator bid quantities for primary-down and secondary-
down regulation are limited by the parameters α4, and α5, which denote the maximum
share of these components as a fraction of P
Dn









j ∀j ∈ J (5.6)
Fig. 5.2(b) shows the total available capacity for ‘down’ services (P
Dn
j ) from a generator
in the real-time market, the components for various services, and also the day-ahead market
commitments.
It is to be noted that the parameters α1 - α5 will be decided by the genco, while
satisfying the relations:
α1,j + α2,j + α3,j ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J (5.7)
α4,j + α5,j ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J (5.8)
5.3.2 BESS Offers
The maximum bid by a BESS e for ‘down’ services (i.e., charging, primary-down and
secondary-down regulation) for a particular real-time market interval, is based on its sched-
uled day-ahead charging energy, reserved spinning reserve capacity, and SOC at start of
the real-time interval, given as follows:
E
Dn
e = SOCe − ECh,DAe − ESR,DAe − SOC0e ∀e ∈ E (5.9)
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The individual components of the BESS bid quantities in real-time for charging, primary-
down, and secondary-down regulation, are limited by the parameters γ1, γ2, and γ3, which
denote the maximum share of these components as a fraction of E
Dn













e ∀e ∈ E (5.10)
(a) Charging bids
(b) Discharging offers
Figure 5.3: BESS offer quantities in real-time energy and regulation reserve markets (a)
charging bids, (b) discharging offers
Fig. 5.3(a) shows the total available capacity for ‘down’ services (E
Dn
e ) from a BESS in
the real-time market, the components for various services, and also the day-ahead market
commitments.
The maximum offer by a BESS e for ‘up’ services (i.e., discharging, primary-up, and
secondary-up regulation) for a particular real-time market interval, is based on its scheduled
day-ahead discharging energy, spinning reserve capacity, and SOC at start of the real-time





e − EDch,DAe − ESR,DAe − SOCe ∀e ∈ E (5.11)
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The individual components of the BESS offer quantities for discharging, primary-up,
and secondary-up regulation, are limited by the parameters γ4, γ5, and γ6, which denote
the maximum share of these components as a fraction E
Up













e ∀e ∈ E (5.12)
Fig. 5.3(b) shows the total available capacity for ‘up’ services (E
Up
e ) from a BESS in
the real-time market, the components for various services, and also the day-ahead market
commitments.
It is to be noted that the parameters γ1 - γ6 will be decided by the BESS owner, while
satisfying the relations:
γ1,e + γ2,e + γ3,e ≤ 1 ∀e ∈ E (5.13)
γ4,e + γ5,e + γ6,e ≤ 1 ∀e ∈ E (5.14)
5.4 Proposed Real-Time Market Model Including
BESS
5.4.1 Objective Function

















































































































In 5.15, the term (a) represents the expected gross surplus of customers and the BESS
during charging while the expected energy cost of generators is represented by (b). The
expected costs of up/down primary regulation and up/down secondary regulation pro-
visions from generators are represented by (c) and (d), respectively. The expected cost
of BESS for energy provisions during discharging is given in (e). The expected costs of
up/down primary regulation and up/down secondary regulation provisions from the BESS,
are represented by (f) and (g), respectively.
5.4.2 Constraints
The objective function in (5.15) is subjected to the following constraints,
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Pre-disturbance Demand-Supply Balance
These constraints are formulated using the dc load flow equations to ensure a balance























0.5P lossi,q,s0 +Bi,q,s0(δi,s0 − δq,s0)
)
∀i ∈ I (5.16)
Demand-Supply Balance Considering Primary Regulation Service
The following constraints are formulated using the dc load flow equations to ensure a
balance between the supply and demand at each bus considering a set of contingency






























0.5P lossi,q,s +Bi,q,s(δi,s − δq,s)
)



























0.5P lossi,q,s +Bi,q,s(δi,s − δq,s)
)
∀i ∈ I,∀s ∈ S1 (5.18)
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Demand-Supply Balance Considering Secondary Regulation Services
The following constraints are formulated using the dc load flow equations to ensure a
balance between the supply and demand at each bus considering a set of load deviation





























0.5P lossi,q,s +Bi,q,s(δi,s − δq,s)
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0.5P lossi,q,s +Bi,q,s(δi,s − δq,s)
)
∀i ∈ I,∀s ∈ S2 (5.20)
Market Clearing Constraints for Generators and Loads
These constraints ensure that during normal operating conditions the cleared demand and








WDAj ∀j ∈ J (5.22)
The following constraints ensure that during contingency conditions arising in the sys-
















j,s ∀j ∈ J,∀s ∈ S1 (5.24)
The following constraints ensure that during load deviation conditions arising in the















j,s ∀j ∈ J,∀s ∈ S2 (5.26)
Generators cannot simultaneously offer regulation-up and regulation-down services, and
that is ensured by the following constraints,
WGRUj,s +W
GRD
j,s ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J,∀s ∈ S1, S2 (5.27)
The total cleared energy and reserve provisions by the generator should be within its










+ PGPRUj,s − PGPRDj,s
+ PGSRUj,s − PGSRDj,s ) ≤ P j WDAj ∀j ∈ J,∀s ∈ S1, S2 (5.28)
Market Clearing Constraints for BESS
The following constraints ensure that the charging and discharging quantities cleared from








Z2DAe ∀e ∈ E (5.30)
















e,s ∀e ∈ E,∀s ∈ S1 (5.32)















e,s ∀e ∈ E,∀s ∈ S2 (5.34)
BESS cannot simultaneously offer regulation-up and regulation-down services and that
is ensured by the following constraints,
ZERUe,s + Z
ERD
e,s ≤ 1 ∀e ∈ E,∀s ∈ S1, S2 (5.35)
Primary Regulation Related Constraints

















∀s ∈ S1 (5.37)
The share of the primary-up regulation from a generator and BESS are governed by








∀e ∈ E,∀s ∈ S1 (5.39)
Similarly, the share of the primary-down regulation from a generator and BESS are









∀e ∈ E,∀s ∈ S1 (5.41)
In this work, the values for generator and BESS droops, Rj and Re are considered to
be in the range of 0.0075 to 0.1 Hz/MW, depending on the maximum power rating of
the respective generator and BESS unit. Similarly, the value of Req is chosen as 0.00086
Hz/MW.
Furthermore, the system frequency deviation must be maintained within the limits,
which is ensured by the following constraints,
∆fmin ≤ ∆fs ≤ ∆fmax ∀s ∈ S1 (5.42)
In this work, the maximum frequency deviation is considered to be ∆fmax = ∆fmin = 0.2
Hz.
Secondary Regulation Related Constraints
The secondary-up and down regulation service provided from generator and BESS should















s ∀s ∈ S2 (5.44)
BESS Operational Constraints
The BESS energy balance relates the SOC at a given time interval with its charging/
discharging operation and regulation provisions, given as follows,















∆k ∀e ∈ E,∀s ∈ S1, S2 (5.45)
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The total cleared energy and reserve capacity provisions by the BESS should be within








+ EPRUe,s + E
SRU
e,s )
+ (ECh,DAe + E
Ch
e,s0




≤ SOCe ∀e ∈ E,∀s ∈ S1, S2 (5.46)
The following constraints ensure that the power drawn/supplied during the charg-






























e ∀e ∈ E,∀s ∈ S1, S2 (5.52)
The following relations relates the power and energy quantities cleared from a BESS
during charging, discharging and regulation services, for a given real-time market interval.
Pe,s∆k = Ee,s ∀e ∈ E,∀s (5.53)
Transmission Line Constraints
These constraints ensure that the line power flows are within their limits.
Bi,q,s(δi,s − δq,s) ≤ PFlowi,q ∀i, q ∈ I,∀s (5.54)
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5.5 Energy and Reserve Market Price Determination
The proposed mathematical model for the BESS integrated, real-time, energy and regula-
tion reserve market, presented in Section 5.4 can be summarized as follows:
Max J(x, y) (5.55)
Subject to:
h0(x, y) = 0 (ψ0) (5.56)
hPRUs (x, y) = 0 (ψ
PRU
s ) (5.57)
hPRDs (x, y) = 0 (ψ
PRD
s ) (5.58)
hSRUs (x, y) = 0 (ψ
SRU
s ) (5.59)
hSRDs (x, y) = 0 (ψ
SRD
s ) (5.60)
g(x, y) ≤ 0 (µ) (5.61)
In the above model, x represents the vector of all continuous decision variables i.e., the
power and energy quantities cleared during the normal, contingency and load deviation
scenarios and y represents the vector of binary decision variables i.e., the status parameters.
The equality constraints (5.56)-(5.60) represent the nodal supply-demand balance for
normal, primary regulation and secondary regulation scenarios (5.16)-(5.20). The La-






s , and ψ
SRD
s ) are
shown in the brackets corresponding to each set of equation.
The marginal cost of energy is the change in the value of J in (5.15) for an infinitesimal
change in PDi,s0 (5.16)-(5.20). Similarly, the marginal cost of PR reserves is the change in
the value of J for an infinitesimal change POuti,s (5.17)-(5.18) and the marginal cost of SR
reserves is the change in the value of J for an infinitesimal change P
Dev−Up/Dn
i,s (5.19)-(5.20).
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5.6 Results & Discussions
To validate the proposed BESS integrated energy and regulation reserve market model,
the IEEE RTS [94], considered in the previous Chapters, is used. Also, BESS units of
different sizes are located at buses - 4, 5, 9, 19 and 20, as given in Chapter-4, Section
4.6. To demonstrate the functionalities of the proposed market model, the results of a
single settlement period (first 5-minute interval of hour-18) is presented. The loads, gencos
and BESS owners submit bids and offers for participating in the energy and regulation
reserve markets, as discussed in Section 5.3. The demand bids, generator bid/offers, BESS
bid/offers for the first 5-minute interval in the real-time market is considered with a 10-25%
scaling of the bid/offer data given in Appendix (Table B.1, B.2, B.4).
The proposed model is formulated as a MIP problem and solved using the CPLEX
solver in GAMS [95, 105]. In order to study the impact of BESS participation on market
settlement and system operation, two case studies are considered:
• Case 1: Base case (no BESS participation) - only generators and loads participate in
the real-time energy and regulation markets.
• Case 2: With BESS participation - in addition to generators and loads, there are 10
BESS units located across five buses participating in energy and regulation markets.
To investigate the impact of uncertainties on market clearing and on system operation,
seven scenarios are constructed by considering specific probabilities associated with each
(ρs), the details of which are given in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Operational Scenarios
Set Scenario (s) Description ρs
S0 Sc1 Normal operation. 0.79
S1
Sc2 Generator G-1 at bus-1 scheduled for 20 MW under normal operation, is on outage. 0.1
Sc3 Generator G-9 at bus-7 scheduled for 50 MW under normal operation, is on outage. 0.04
Sc4 Generator G-13 at bus-13 scheduled for 85 MW under normal operation, is on outage. 0.05
Sc5 Line 13-23 is on outage. 0.004
S2
Sc6 A sudden load increase of 30 MW at bus-7 0.01
Sc7 A sudden load reduction of 20 MW at bus-13 0.01
5.6.1 Case 1: Base Case (no BESS participation)
Table 5.2 shows the expected generation and the expected primary-up/down and secondary-
up/down regulation reserve quantities cleared in the real-time market. The real-time ex-
pected generation cleared for each generator, E[PG], is over and above that cleared in the
day-ahead market. The expected values of primary-up and down, and secondary-up and
down regulation reserves, E[PGPRU], E[PGPRD], E[PGSRU], and E[PGSRD], respectively,
are obtained considering the various contingency and load deviation scenarios, with their
respective probabilities, and using the demand-supply balance constraints (5.17)-(5.18) for
primary regulation, and (5.19)-(5.20) for secondary regulation, in place of (5.16).
Table 5.2: Expected generation and regulation reserve schedules for Case-1 (MW)
E[PG] E[PGPRU] E[PGPRD] E[PGSRU] E[PGSRD] E[Dispatch]
G1 11.06 0 0 0 0 11.06
G2 0 0.72 0 0.06 0 0.78
G5 0 0.82 0 0.04 0 0.86
G6 0 0.66 0 0.04 0 0.7
G9 24.49 4.1 0 0 0 28.59
G10 25.28 1.35 0 0 0 26.63
G11 25.28 0.6 0 0 0 25.88
G13 88.48 0 0.1 0 0.1 88.28
G14 46.61 0 0 0 0.1 46.51
G15 0 0 0 0.16 0 0.16
Total 221.2 8.25 0.1 0.3 0.2 229.45
As noted from Table 5.2, generators G-13 and G-14 provide significant portion of the
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additional demand appearing in the real-time market, this is because of their lowest offer
prices. In Sc2, Sc3, and Sc4, the loss of generation as a result of the outage of the respective
generators G-1, G-9 and G-13 respectively, is made up through the primary-up regulation
reserve provided by other generators. While in the case of a line outage (between bus 13-23)
considered in Sc5 the generator, G-13 provides the primary-down regulation reserve.
The total expected demand cleared in the real-time market, over and above the day-
ahead cleared demand, is 219.9 MW (Table 5.3), plus the system losses (1.3 MW), is same
as the total of E[PG] in Table 5.2.
The expected social welfare in Case-1 is $10,498.










Sc1 Sc2 Sc3 Sc4 Sc5 Sc6 Sc7
Bus-1 69.78 3.34 1.38 1.73 0 0.33 0
Bus-2 71.45 0 2.10 2.67 0 0.26 0
Bus-7 39.39 2.98 1.56 0 0 0 0
Bus-13 68.13 0 0 3.29 0.08 0 0.29
Bus-15 49.51 0 0 0 0 0.21 0
The expected values of the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the power balance
equations corresponding to the normal operation (5.16), under contingency [5.17-5.18],
and load deviation [5.19-5.20]scenarios are shown in Table 5.4. It is to be noted that E[ψ0]
related to the pre-disturbance condition are higher at Bus-1 and 2 because of a congestion
arising on line 1-2 and the expensive generator located at these Bus-2. Similarly, the values
E[ψPRUs ] related to primary regulation reserves is higher at Bus-1 and 13 because of the
contingency occuring at these buses.
The expected nodal energy prices, E[λE] and nodal reserve prices, E[λR], are reported
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s ] E[λE] E[λR]
Bus-1 69.78 6.45 0.33 76.56 6.78
Bus-2 71.45 4.77 0.26 76.48 5.03
Bus-7 39.39 4.54 0 43.93 4.54
Bus-13 68.13 3.37 0.29 71.79 3.66
Bus-15 49.51 0 0.21 49.72 0.21
in Table 5.5, given by (5.63) and (5.64) respectively, and are obtained from the values of
E[ψ0], E[ψ
PRU




s ] and E[ψ
SRD
s ] given in Table 5.4. It is to be noted
that the expected nodal energy prices, E[λE] includes the reserve price component E[λR];
while E[λR] is also explicitly given for the sake of clarity, in Table 5.5. For example, at
Bus-1, the energy component is 69.78$/MWh, the reserve component is 6.78 $/MWh, and
these together constitutes the nodal energy price of 76.56$/MWh.
5.6.2 Case 2: With BESS participation
Table 5.6 shows the expected cleared generation, BESS discharge and primary-up/down
and secondary-up/down reserve quantities cleared in the real-time market, for the respec-
tive generators and BESSs. It is noted that there is a slight increase in the total expected
generation (including BESS discharge) cleared, i.e., E[PG] + E[PDchE], as a result of in-
crease in the total expected demand cleared in the real-time market, in Case-2 as compared
to Case-1 (Table 5.3).
It is also noted that with the participation of BESS, there is a change in E[PG] in
Case-2 as compared to Case-1, except for G-13 and G-14, which are at their maximum
capacity since these are the cheapest unit. Furthermore, the participation of BESS has
resulted in reduction of E[PGPRU] and E[PGPRD] from expensive generators G-2, G-5, G-
6, and G-9 in Case-2 as compared to Case-1, because of the cheaper reserve offers from
BESS. However, the contribution of BESS for secondary regulation services is minimal as
compared to generators; this is be attributed to their limited stored energy capacity, as
these BESS are providing energy and primary regulation service also.
It is noted that the participation of BESS has resulted in an increase in the social
welfare of the system in Case-2 ($10,617) as compared to Case 1 ($10,498), which is a 1.1%
increase with respect to the Base Case. The increase in the social welfare ($119 or 1.1%)
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Table 5.6: Expected generation, regulation reserve and BESS schedules for Case-2 (MW)
E[PG] E[PGPRU] E[PGPRD] E[PGSRU] E[PGSRD] E[Dispatch]
G1 0 0 0 0 0 0
G2 0 0.25 0 0.06 0 0.31
G5 0 0.25 0 0.04 0 0.29
G6 0 0.62 0 0.04 0 0.66
G9 22.12 2.75 0 0 0 24.87
G10 23.7 1.35 0 0 0 25.05
G11 23.7 0.6 0 0 0 24.3
G13 88.48 0 0.08 0 0.1 88.3
G14 46.61 0 0 0 0.1 46.51
G15 0 0 0 0.16 0 0.16
E[PDchE] E[PEPRU] E[PEPRD] E[PESRU] E[PESRD]
ES1 7.11 1.21 0 0.06 0 8.38
ES3 12.64 1.22 0 0.02 0 13.88
ES8 4.74 0 0 0 0.1 4.64
Total 229.1 8.25 0.08 0.38 0.3 237.35
between Case-1 and Case-2 may seem low, but when considered for a day or a year, it
would be a significantly large value.










Sc1 Sc2 Sc3 Sc4 Sc5 Sc6 Sc7
Bus-1 65.08 3.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0
Bus-2 66.15 0.00 1.38 2.42 0.00 0.20 0
Bus-7 38.98 2.99 2.50 0 0.00 0 0
Bus-13 69.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0 0.26
Bus-15 51.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0
Bus-4 55.43 2.76 1.11 1.57 0.05 0 0
Bus-5 49.56 2.48 0.99 1.54 0 0.16 0
Bus-19 44.89 0.00 0.90 1.13 0.05 0 0
The expected values of the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the power balance
equations corresponding to the normal operation (5.16), under contingency [5.17-5.18], and
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load deviation [5.19-5.20] scenarios in Case-2, are shown in Table 5.7. It is noted that the
participation of BESS has resulted in significant reduction in the Lagrangian multiplier
E[ψ0] at Bus-1 and 2 because of the reduction of generation from G-1, which removes the
congestion on line 1-2.









s ] E[λE] E[λR]
Bus-1 65.08 3.15 0.33 68.56 3.48
Bus-2 66.15 3.80 0.20 70.15 4.00
Bus-7 38.98 5.49 0.00 44.47 5.49
Bus-13 69.47 0.02 0.26 69.75 0.28
Bus-15 51.37 0.00 0.20 51.57 0.20
Bus-4 55.43 5.48 0.01 60.88 5.49
Bus-5 49.56 5.01 0.16 54.73 5.17
Bus-19 44.89 2.07 0.01 46.93 2.08
The expected nodal energy prices, E[λE] and nodal reserve prices, E[λR] for Case-2
are shown in Table 5.8. It is noted that with the BESS participation, the nodal energy
and reserve prices at all buses except Bus-13 and 15 in Case-2 as compared to Case-1 have
reduced, this is because the cheaper BESS offers replaces some of the expensive generators.
The slight increase in the nodal price at Bus-13 and Bus-15 is because there is an increase
in demand cleared at Bus-13, which has to be supplied from other buses as the cheapest
generator, G-13 located at this bus is operating at its maximum limit.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, a novel framework and mathematical model for simultaneously procuring
primary and secondary regulation reserves, alongside energy, in a BESS integrated electric-
ity market, by taking into account probabilistic scenarios of contingencies in the real-time
operations was proposed. The proposed market model is a co-optimized, LMP-based, which
takes into consideration the a priori cleared day-ahead market schedules. The effective-
ness of the model was validated on the IEEE RTS by considering two realistic case studies,
each with a normal operation scenario, four contingency scenarios, and two load deviation
scenarios. It was noted that BESS participation using the proposed framework resulted in
a higher social welfare, than, when no BESS was present. The advantage of the proposed
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method is that, it helps in avoiding over-estimating the regulation reserve requirements,
thus reducing the system operation cost. It was also seen that the participation of BESS
reduced the energy and reserve prices when it provided services simultaneously in the en-





6.1 Summary and Conclusions
The research presented in this thesis focuses on the development of frameworks and models
for integrating DR and BESSs into electricity markets by considering the various important
features and characteristics of these resources in their bid/offers structure, cost function
models, and operational constraints. The motivations to pursue this research were pre-
sented in Chapter 1, and the research objectives were identified based on a critical review
of the literature.
In Chapter 2, a brief background to the topics related to the research carried out in this
thesis were reviewed. A basic overview of electricity markets including LMP-based market
settlement model and the definitions of the important ancillary services were presented.
Different DR programs in electricity markets were then outlined. Finally, the classifications
of different ESSs, and the important topics related to BESSs such important terminologies,
operational models and the battery degradation mechanisms were presented.
In Chapter 3, a novel and comprehensive formulation of DR bid/offer structure through
PRD and load curtailment based DR bids simultaneously, taking into account customer
preferences for simultaneous participation in energy and spinning reserve markets was
proposed. A new framework and mathematical model for an LMP-based, loss included,
day-ahead, co-optimized energy and spinning reserve market including DR provisions was
proposed. The effectiveness of the proposed model was validated on the IEEE RTS by
considering four case studies under four scenarios.
In Chapter 4, novel BESS cost function models for Degradation Cost, based on its DOD
and discharge rate, and Flexibility Cost are developed. The model is developed considering
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Lithium-ion batteries, and the approach can be applied to other conventional electrochem-
ical batteries, but not flow batteries. These cost functions are used to formulate detailed
BESS bid/offer structures. A new framework and mathematical model were proposed for
BESS participation in an LMP-based, co-optimized, energy and spinning reserve market.
Three case studies are presented to investigate the impact of BESS participation on system
operation and market settlement using the IEEE RTS.
In Chapter 5, a novel framework and mathematical model were proposed for simulta-
neously procuring primary and secondary regulation reserves alongside energy, in a BESS
integrated electricity market, by taking into account probabilistic scenarios of contingencies
in the real-time operations. Detailed studies considering the IEEE RTS, demonstrating the
applicability of the proposed technique, were presented.
The main conclusions of the presented research are:
• The DR provisions, simultaneously considering PRD bids and DR offers, in energy
and spinning reserve markets, resulted in increased social welfare.
• The integration of DR in the energy and spinning reserve market enhanced the eco-
nomic and technical benefits for the ISO by providing more options for system oper-
ation.
• The BESS participation in the day-ahead market, using the proposed cost function
and bid/offer structure, resulted in a higher social welfare than when no BESS was
present or with a simple bid/offer structure for BESS. The participation of BESS also
reduced energy and spinning reserve prices when it provided services in the energy
and spinning reserve markets.
• The studies reveal that BESS participation in day-ahead market: (i) correctly cap-
tured the actual cost of BESS operation, accounting for its degradation and flexibility
attributes, thus providing realistic market clearing decisions, (ii) it appropriately met
the important requirement of FERC Order 841 to develop a participation model for
ESS, accounting for their physical and operational characteristics such as the SOC,
discharge rate, etc., in the ESS bidding parameters, to facilitate their participation
in ISO markets.
• The BESS participation in the real-time market using the proposed framework re-
sulted in a higher social welfare, than, when no BESS was present. It was also seen
that the participation of BESS reduced the energy and reserve prices when it provided
services simultaneously in the energy and regulation reserve markets and helped in
relieving line congestions when placed at appropriate locations.
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• The advantage of including BESS in real-time markets is that, it helps in avoid-
ing over-estimating the regulation reserve requirements, thus reducing the system
operation cost.
6.2 Contributions
The main contributions of the research presented in this thesis can be summarized as
follows:
• A new bid/offer structure for DR provisions, simultaneously through PRD based bids
and load curtailment based DR offers from customers has been developed.
• A novel framework and comprehensive mathematical model have been proposed for
a DR-energy-spinning reserve market, based on LMPs, which includes transmission
loss representation within the dc power flow constraints using a piece-wise linear
approximation approach.
• For the first time, a BESS cost function model considering the Degradation Cost,
which is based on the DOD and discharge rate, and the Flexibility Cost, has been de-
veloped. The model is developed considering Lithium-ion batteries, and the approach
can be applied to other conventional electrochemical batteries, but not flow batteries.
A bid/offer structure for BESS to participate in day-ahead energy and spinning re-
serve markets, capturing the inter-relationships between the BESS charging bid and
discharging offer quantities has been proposed.
• A generic day-ahead market operations framework and comprehensive mathemati-
cal model have been proposed for the integration of BESS in an LMP-based, co-
optimized, day-ahead energy and spinning reserve market by including the proposed
BESS charging bid and discharging offer structure.
• A novel framework for simultaneously procuring primary and secondary regulation
reserves alongside energy has been proposed, in a BESS-integrated, electricity mar-
ket, by taking into account probabilistic scenarios of contingencies in the real-time
operations.
• A novel mathematical model has been developed considering BESS alongside con-
ventional generators to determine the optimal real-time primary and secondary reg-
ulation reserves and energy market clearing, in a co-optimized, LMP based market,
taking into consideration the a priori cleared day-ahead market schedules.
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• All the above formulations and propositions pertaining to BESS, were one of the first
to appropriately meet the important requirement of FERC Order 841 to develop a
participation model for ESSs, accounting for their physical and operational charac-
teristics, such as the SOC, discharge rate, etc., in the ESS bidding parameters, so as
to facilitate their participation in ISO markets.
• The DR and BESS integrated market model presented in this thesis were proposed
for LMP based markets, which are widely adopted in US. However, all the proposed
bid/offer structures, cost functions, and market models are easily adaptable to uni-
form price markets.
• Finally, the impacts of participation of DR in day-ahead, and BESS in day-ahead
and real-time energy and reserve markets, on market prices, market clearing dispatch,
and other economic indicators, for various scenarios and cases have been carried out.
The main contents and contributions of Chapter 3 have been published in IEEE Trans-
actions on Power Systems [104] and 2019 CIGRE Canada Conference [16]. The main
contents of Chapter 4 has been reported in a paper currently under review for publication
in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems [106], and the main contents of Chapter 5 has
been reported in a paper currently under review for publication in IEEE Transactions on
Smart Grid [107].
6.3 Future Work
• In order to capture the full impact of DR participation in electricity markets, the
proposed DR models, bid/offer structures in this thesis should be extended to real-
time markets too. This will enhance the system performance and introduce a new
revenue stream for DR providers.
• The inclusion of RES, by appropriately capturing their uncertain behaviour in the
proposed day-ahead and real-time electricity market models need be investigated; this
will highlight the benefits of the proposed frameworks and show how the developed
models in this thesis could hedge the risks from increasing RES penetration.
• The BESS cost function models and bid offer structures proposed in Chapter 4 of
the thesis were based on the characteristics of lithium ion batteries. Similar cost
functions and bid/offer structures need be developed for other battery technologies
such as lead acid, nickel cadmium etc., using the approach proposed in this thesis.
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• In this thesis the focus was at the wholesale market and system level. But when
the distribution system level is considered, the local distribution companies (LDCs)
also encounter challenges such as increasing peaks, increased losses, deterioration in
voltage profiles, etc. At the same time, there has been a significant increase in the
residential ESS deployment in recent years in Ontario [38]. In this context, it is
important to examine if medium/small-scale ESS and DR can provide cost effective
solutions for some of the aforementioned problems for the LDCs, which can be carried
out in line with the frameworks and model presented in this thesis.
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Table A.1: Generating unit location & capability [92]


































Table A.2: Generator Min./Max. Up/Down time and reliability data [92]









U12 12 Oil/Steam 0.02 2 4 2
U20 20 Oil/CT 0.1 1 1 3
U50 50 Hydro 0.01 N/A
U76 76 Coal/Steam 0.02 4 8 2
U100 100 Oil/Steam 0.04 8 8 7
U155 155 Coal/Steam 0.04 8 8 3
U197 197 Nuclear 0.05 10 12 20
U350 350 Coal/Steam 0.08 48 24 4
U400 400 Nuclear 0.12 1 1 20





















Table A.4: Hourly peak load in percent of daily peak [92]
Hour Hourly Load (%)
12:00 -1:00 AM 78
1:00 - 2:00 AM 72
2:00 - 3:00 AM 68
3:00 - 4:00 AM 66
4:00 - 5:00 AM 64
5:00 - 6:00 AM 65
6:00 - 7:00 AM 66
7:00 - 8:00 AM 70
8:00 - 9:00 AM 80
9:00 - 10:00 AM 88
10:00 - 11:00 AM 90
11:00 - Noon 91
Noon - 1:00 PM 90
1:00 - 2:00 PM 88
2:00 - 3:00 PM 87
3:00 - 4:00 PM 91
4:00 - 5:00 PM 100
5:00 - 6:00 PM 99
6:00 - 7:00 PM 97
7:00 - 8:00 PM 95
8:00 - 9:00 PM 94
9:00 - 10:00 PM 92
10:00 - 11:00 PM 87
11:00 - 12:00 AM 81
130
Table A.5: Transmission line length, impedance and rating data [92]







1 1 2 3 0.003 0.014 0.461 175
2 1 3 55 0.055 0.211 0.057 175
3 1 5 22 0.022 0.085 0.023 175
4 2 4 33 0.033 0.127 0.034 175
5 2 6 50 0.05 0.192 0.052 175
6 3 9 31 0.031 0.119 0.032 175
7 3 24 0 0.002 0.084 0 400
8 4 9 27 0.027 0.104 0.028 175
9 5 10 23 0.023 0.088 0.024 175
10 6 10 16 0.014 0.061 2.459 175
11 7 8 16 0.016 0.061 0.017 175
12 8 9 43 0.042 0.161 0.044 175
13 8 10 43 0.043 0.165 0.045 175
14 9 11 0 0.043 0.165 0.045 175
15 9 12 0 0.002 0.084 0 400
16 10 11 0 0.002 0.084 0 400
17 10 12 0 0.002 0.084 0 400
18 11 13 33 0.006 0.048 0.1 500
19 11 14 29 0.005 0.042 0.088 500
20 12 13 33 0.006 0.048 0.1 500
21 12 23 67 0.012 0.097 0.203 500
22 13 23 60 0.011 0.087 0.182 500
23 14 16 27 0.005 0.059 0.082 500
24 15 16 12 0.002 0.017 0.036 500
25 15 21 34 0.006 0.049 0.103 500
26 15 21 34 0.006 0.049 0.103 500
27 15 24 36 0.007 0.052 0.109 500
28 16 17 18 0.003 0.026 0.055 500
29 16 19 16 0.003 0.023 0.049 500
30 17 18 10 0.002 0.014 0.03 500
31 17 22 73 0.014 0.105 0.221 500
32 18 21 18 0.003 0.026 0.055 500
33 18 21 18 0.003 0.026 0.055 500
34 19 20 27.5 0.005 0.04 0.083 500
35 19 20 27.5 0.005 0.04 0.083 500
36 20 23 15 0.003 0.022 0.046 500
37 20 23 15 0.003 0.022 0.046 500
38 21 22 47 0.009 0.068 0.142 500
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Table B.1: Generator offers in energy and spinning reserve markets
Generator - Energy Offers Generator - Spinning reserve offers
Gen. Size Gen. Type Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price
12 MW Oil/Steam 5 45.68 6 52.73 1 55.54 1 18.27 1 21.09 0 22.22
20 MW Oil/CT 5 56.41 10 105.12 5 129.47 1 22.56 2 42.05 1 51.79
76 MW Coal/Steam 25 12 40 15.15 11 16.02 5 4.80 7 6.06 2 6.41
100 MW Oil/Steam 35 37.14 35 41.92 10 44.05 7 14.86 9 16.77 4 17.62
155 MW Coal/Steam 50 10.33 80 11.47 25 11.82 10 4.13 15 4.59 6 4.73
197 MW Oil/Steam 60 36.68 100 41.1 37 42.74 12 14.67 20 16.44 8 17.10
350 MW Coal/Steam 120 10.49 175 12 55 12.42 24 4.20 36 4.80 10 4.97
400 MW Nuclear 150 5.76 200 6 50 6.06 30 2.30 40 2.40 10 2.42
Note: All bid/offer quantities are in MW, energy prices are in $/MWh, and spinning reserve prices in
$/MW
Table B.2: Demand energy bids and DR energy, spinning reserve offers (for hour-18)
Demand Bids DRE - Offers DRSR - Offers
Bus Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price
1 75.6 100 21.6 80.6 10.8 70.4 0.54 110 1.08 84.7 3.78 53.9 0.54 44 1.08 33.9 3.78 21.6
2 67.9 100 19.4 90.4 9.7 85.9 0.5 110 1 94.9 3.4 90.2 0.5 44 1 38 3.4 36.1
3 126 100 36 72.2 18 67.1 0.9 110 1.8 75.8 6.3 70.4 0.9 44 1.8 30.3 6.3 28.2
4 51.8 100 14.8 86.7 7.4 73.5 0.4 110 0.7 91.1 2.6 57.1 0.4 44 0.7 36.4 2.6 22.9
5 49.7 100 14.2 70.7 7.1 68.5 0.4 110 0.7 74.2 2.5 72 0.4 44 0.7 29.7 2.5 28.8
6 95.2 100 27.2 80.3 13.6 74.6 0.7 110 1.4 84.3 4.8 58.4 0.7 44 1.4 33.7 4.8 23.3
7 87.5 100 25 95.7 12.5 90.4 0.6 110 1.3 100.5 4.4 95 0.6 44 1.3 40.2 4.4 38
8 119.7 100 34.2 73.3 17.1 67.8 0.9 110 1.7 76.9 6 71.2 0.9 44 1.7 30.8 6 28.5
9 122.5 100 35 72.2 17.5 62.2 0.9 110 1.8 72.6 6.1 55.3 0.9 44 1.8 29 6.1 22.1
10 136.5 100 39 83.5 19.5 58.5 1 110 2 86.7 6.8 57.4 1 44 2 34.7 6.8 23
13 185.5 100 53.0 75.5 26.5 56 1.3 110 2.7 78 9.3 56.8 1.3 44 2.7 31.2 9.3 22.7
14 135.8 100 38.8 81.3 19.4 67.5 1 110 1.9 78.3 6.8 57.4 1 44 1.9 31.3 6.8 23
15 221.9 100 63.4 74.6 31.7 60.1 1.6 110 3.2 75.9 11.1 63.1 1.6 44 3.2 30.3 11.1 25.3
16 70 100 20 79.8 10 74.1 0.5 110 1 83.8 3.5 57.8 1 44 1 33.5 3.5 23.1
18 233.1 100 66.6 95.7 33.3 86.3 1.7 110 3.3 100.5 11.7 90.6 1.7 44 3.3 40.2 11.7 36.2
19 126.7 100 36.2 91.0 18.1 88.1 0.9 110 1.8 95.6 6.3 92.5 0.9 44 1.8 38.2 6.3 37
20 89.6 100 25.6 89.6 12.8 84.2 0.6 110 1.3 94.0 4.5 88.4 0.6 44 1.3 37.6 4.5 35.4
Note: All bid/offer quantities are in MW, energy prices are in $/MWh, and spinning reserve prices in
$/MW
Table B.3: Maximum duration of DR provision at a bus
Bus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
DRT (Hours) 4 2 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 2 2
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Table B.4: BESS data





max a b c d C2
(MWh) (MWh) (p.u) (MW) (p.u.) (p.u.) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($) ($) ($)
1 3 15 0.4 25 0.95 1 -36.23 34.80 2.77 -3.45 18
2 3 15 0.5 25 0.95 1 -36.23 34.80 2.77 -3.45 18
3 6 30 0.7 15 0.95 1 -36.23 34.80 2.77 -2.90 12
4 6 30 0.7 15 0.95 1 -36.23 34.80 2.77 -2.90 12
5 10 50 0.3 20 0.95 1 -36.23 34.80 2.77 -2.45 8
6 10 50 0.3 20 0.95 1 -36.23 34.80 2.77 -2.45 8
7 2 12.5 0.75 20 0.95 1 -36.23 34.80 2.77 -3.75 15
8 2 12.5 0.75 20 0.95 1 -36.23 34.80 2.77 -3.75 15
9 2 12.5 0.5 20 0.95 1 -36.23 34.80 2.77 -3.75 15
10 2 12.5 0.5 20 0.95 1 -36.23 34.80 2.77 -3.75 15
134
